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TAXPAYER CHOICES, ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS,
AND THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL &
STATE TAX SYSTEMS
Heather M. Field*

Abstract
Almost 30 million taxpayers who itemized their federal deductions for the
2017 tax year switched to the standard deduction for 2018. The provisions of the
Tax Cuts & Jobs Act (“TCJA”) that led to this shift were intended to simplify the
individual income tax system. This Article’s empirical study of federal and state tax
filing data, however, demonstrates that the TCJA’s simplifying effect varied stateto-state depending on whether a state obligated its taxpayers to make the same
choice for state tax purposes (i.e., to itemize deductions or take the standard
deduction) as the taxpayer made for federal purposes. In states that obligated
taxpayers to make the same choice, taxpayers experienced at least some
simplification, and tax administration by the IRS and state tax authorities became
materially easier, although the IRS’s simplification benefit was dampened to some
degree. In states that allowed taxpayers to make state tax choices that differed from
their federal choices, the TCJA’s simplifying effect for many taxpayers was largely
illusory, state income tax administration actually became more complex, and some
tax enforcement costs were, in effect, shifted from the IRS to state tax authorities.
Thus, this Article’s study reveals that state-level rules about tax choices
undermined the federal policy goal motivating the TCJA’s itemization-related
changes.
A taxpayer’s choice whether to itemize is just one of many tax elections
explicitly provided to taxpayers. Accordingly, this Article’s study of taxpayers’
itemization choices also serves as an example that illustrates a broader point—
state-level rules about whether taxpayers must make uniform federal and state tax
elections create important, but previously underappreciated, interactions between
the federal and state tax systems. Policymakers cannot fully understand the policy
implications of many federal tax law changes unless they appreciate these
federal/state interactions. This Article helps policymakers do so.

*
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INTRODUCTION
The Tax Cuts & Jobs Act (“TCJA”), 1 enacted in December 2017, was
intended to reduce dramatically the number of taxpayers that itemize their
deductions, thereby simplifying the individual income tax system. 2 As anticipated,
the rate of itemization on federal income tax returns decreased from 30.6% for the
2017 tax year (pre-TCJA) to 11.4% for the 2018 tax year (post-TCJA).3 Almost 30
million fewer federal income tax returns had itemized deductions. That meant
almost 30 million fewer Schedule A forms filed with the IRS and almost 30 million
fewer taxpayers whose itemized deductions the IRS might audit. Thus, at a high
level, the TCJA’s itemization-related changes—specifically, the increase to the
standard deduction and limits on itemized deductions—seem to have simplified the
income tax system for individual taxpayers and the IRS.
This Article’s analysis of federal and state individual income tax filing data
for 2017 and 2018, however, tells a more complex story both for taxpayers and tax
administrators. Specifically, the data show that a significant number of individual
taxpayers in some states (including, for example, more than 22% of individual filers
in Oregon4) switched from itemizing to taking the standard deduction for federal
purposes but continued to itemize for state purposes. Thus, these taxpayers did not
experience nearly as much simplification as the federal itemization data, alone,
suggest. In addition, the simplification benefits experienced by the IRS as a result
of the TCJA’s itemization-related changes were dampened because some taxpayers
continued to itemize for federal purposes post-TCJA even though their federal
itemized deductions were less than the federal standard deduction. Further, and
perhaps most notably, the decline in federal itemization rates, which simplified tax
administration for the IRS, increased the complexity of tax administration for tax
authorities in several states. The net effect was to shift some enforcement costs from
the IRS to state tax administrators.
As this Article will explain, whether one or more of the foregoing consequences
arose for a particular state or its taxpayers depended largely on whether the state
(a) obligated taxpayers to make the same election—to itemize or take the standard
deduction—for state purposes as the taxpayer made for federal purposes, or (b)
allowed taxpayers to make an independent choice about whether to itemize
deductions or take the standard deduction for state purposes (i.e., regardless of the
itemization choice that the taxpayer made for federal purposes). That is, a state’s
1
The official name of this legislation is “An Act to provide for reconciliation pursuant to
titles II and V of the concurrent resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018.” Pub. L. No. 115-97,
131 Stat. 2054 (2017). Although the bill’s original title, the “Tax Cuts and Jobs Act,” was stricken
from the final legislation, many commentators continue to use that name. See, e.g., Kamin et al.,
The Games They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the 2017 Tax Legislation,
103 MINN. L. REV. 1439 (2019). This Article does the same.
2
See infra Part I.B.
3
SOI Tax Stats – Individual Income Tax Returns Complete Report (Publication 1304), IRS,
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns-publication-1304-com
plete-report [https://perma.cc/R76L-355V] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021) (Table 1.4. All
Returns: Sources of Income, Adjustments, and Tax Items, by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Tax
Year 2017 & Tax Year 2018) and author calculations.
4
See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
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“tax election uniformity rule” affected the success of the federal policy goal
motivating the TCJA’s itemization-related changes.
These consequences have been overlooked by existing scholarship. On the
one hand, this omission is surprising because the TCJA’s itemization-related
changes were touted by proponents as simplifying. 5 On the other hand, the omission
may not be surprising because scholars have paid relatively little attention, either
in general or in the context of the TCJA, to tax election uniformity rules or the
indirect interactions between federal and state tax regimes that these rules create. 6
Commentators analyzing the interactions between federal and state tax laws,
whether in general or in the context of the TCJA specifically, typically focus on
conformity (i.e., whether a state’s income tax laws change to follow federal income
tax law changes,7 including changes made by the TCJA),8 tax preferences such as
the deductibility (now capped 9) of state and local taxes for purposes of the federal
income tax, 10 or administrative cooperation between the federal and state tax
authorities.11 Even when election uniformity has been mentioned in the context of
the TCJA, commentators and policymakers generally focused on the impact on

5

See infra Part I.B.
See Heather M. Field, Binding Choices: Tax Elections & Federal/State Conformity, 32
VA. TAX REV. 527 (2013) (the one law review article discussing policy considerations relevant to
states’ election uniformity rules); see also infra note 12 (citing sources that discuss the state revenue
effects of the TCJA in light of states’ election uniformity rules).
7
See, e.g., Jane G. Gravelle & Jennifer Gravelle, How Federal Policymakers Account for
the Concerns of State and Local Governments in the Formulation of Federal Tax Policy, 60 NAT’L
TAX J. 631 (2007); LeAnn Luna & Ann Boyd Watts, Federal Tax Legislative Changes and State
Conformity, 100 PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N NAT’L TAXPAYER ASSOC. 260 (2007); Ruth Mason,
Delegating Up: State Conformity with the Federal Tax Base, 62 DUKE L.J. 1267 (2013); Ralph B.
Tower & Caroline M. Boyd, Tax Base Modifications: The Hidden Barrier to Simplification, 41 ST.
TAX NOTES 165 (2006). Commentators also discuss the relationship between federal and state tax
laws as part of broader discussions about fiscal federalism. See, e.g., Daniel Shaviro, An Economic
and Political Look at Federalism in Taxation, 90 MICH. L. R EV. 895 (1992); Kirk J. Stark, The
Federal Role in State Tax Reform, 30 VA. TAX REV. 407, 423 (2010); David A. Super, Rethinking
Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544 (2005).
8
See, e.g., Dylan Grundman, What the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Means for States—A Guide
to Impacts and Options, INST. TAX’N & ECON. POL’Y (Jan. 26, 2018), https://itep.org/what-the-taxcuts-and-jobs-act-means-for-states-a-guide-to-impacts-and-options/
[https://perma.cc/7ZWXN49K]; Amy Monahan, State Individual Income Tax Conformity in Practice: Evidence from the Tax
Cuts & Jobs Act, 11 COLUM. J. TAX L. 57 (2019); Darien Shanske & David Gamage, Why States
Should Tax the GILTI, 91 ST. TAX NOTES 751 (2019); Adam Thimmesch et al., Strategic
Nonconformity to the TCJA, Part 1: Personal Income Taxes, 97 TAX NOTES ST. 17 (2020); Jared
Walczak, Toward a State of Conformity: State Tax Codes a Year After Federal Tax Reform, TAX
FOUND. (Jan.
28,
2019)
https://taxfoundation.org/state-conformity-one-year-after-tcja/
[https://perma.cc/8YWN-3M3R].
9
I.R.C. § 164(b)(6)(B), codifying Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 208586 (2017) (capping the deductibility of state and local taxes at $10,000).
10
See, e.g., Daniel Hemel, The Death and Life of the State and Local Tax Deduction, 72
TAX L. REV. 151 (2019); Manoj Viswanathan, Hyperlocal Responses to the SALT Deduction
Limitation, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 294 (2019).
11
See, e.g., Harley Duncan & LeAnn Luna, Lending a Helping Hand: Two Governments
Can Work Together, 60 NAT’L TAX J. 663 (2007); Erin Adele Scharff, Laboratories of Bureaucracy:
Administrative Cooperation Between State and Federal Tax Authorities, 68 TAX L. REV. 699 (2015).
6
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state tax revenue and the size of individual taxpayers’ state income tax bills, 12 rather
than on simplicity.
Admittedly, the impact of states’ election uniformity rules on the degree of
simplification created by the TCJA may have been difficult to identify or appreciate
without a careful study of federal and state individual income tax filing data from
before and after the TCJA’s enactment (i.e., from 2017 and 2018). Thus, I gathered
and analyzed that data, and this Article discusses the results and their implications.
My study shows that the simplifying effects of the TCJA’s itemization-related
changes varied state-to-state depending on states’ itemization election uniformity
rules.13 In states that allowed different federal and state itemization choices, the
TCJA’s simplifying effect was largely illusory for many taxpayers, and state tax
administration became more complex. In contrast, in states that required uniform
federal and state itemization elections, the TCJA’s changes were generally much
more simplifying for taxpayers and tax authorities, although the IRS’s benefit was
dampened, at least slightly, because states bound taxpayers to their federal
itemization elections.
This Article’s analysis also illustrates a broader point—that states’ tax
election uniformity rules are critical to understanding the relationship between the
federal and state tax regimes and should be considered in the policy analysis of any
tax change that relates to a tax election. There are hundreds of tax elections, 14 and
the itemization election, discussed here, is merely one example of where the policy
implications of a federal tax law change cannot be fully understood without
understanding states’ tax election uniformity rules. The same is true for many other
tax elections, including a married couple’s election whether to file jointly or
separately,15 an eligible corporation’s election to be taxed as an “S corporation”

12

See, e.g., Grundman, supra note 8; Erin Huffer et al., Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act on State Individual Income Taxes, 58 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 205 (2019); Walczak, supra note
8; see also, e.g., RICHARD AUXIER & KIM RUEBEN, TAX POLICY CTR., CONFORMITY, COVID-19,
AND
STATE
BUDGETS
15-18
(Jan.
2021)
https://governor.kansas.gov/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/tpc_kansas_ january_2021.pdf [https:// perma.cc/2SHV-MUHL] (in a
presentation to Kansas Governor’s Council on Tax Reform, discussing Kansas taxpayers who pay
higher state taxes but lower overall taxes because of TCJA’s increased standard deduction and
Kansas’s itemization uniformity rule, and briefly mentioning the possibility of administration issues
if Kansas changed its itemization uniformity rule); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN.,
PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT (Jan. 2018)
https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/stats/stat_pit/pit/
preliminary-report-tcja-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/FT5Y-8BWP] (estimating $44 million revenue increase absent change to New
York’s 2017 itemization uniformity requirement); VA. DEP’T OF TAXATION, ESTIMATED IMPACT OF
THE
TCJA,
14-15,
17,
21
(Nov.
19,
2018)
http://leg5.state.va.us/
User_db/frmView.aspx?ViewId=5343&s=23 [https://perma.cc/5YSS-W3BZ] (estimating that the
increase in federal standard deduction coupled with Virginia’s itemization uniformity law would
generate over $121 million in state revenue in the 2019 fiscal year, and that allowing taxpayers to
itemize for state purposes regardless of federal election would cost Virginia more than $350 million
in revenue in the 2020 fiscal year and more than $250 million in revenue in the 2021 fiscal year).
13
See infra Part III.
14
ANTHONY J. DECHELLIS & KAREN L. HORNE, PPC’S TAX ELECTION DESKBOOK (26th
ed. 2020) (discussing over 300 tax elections).
15
I.R.C. § 6031.
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rather than as a “C corporation,” 16 and the election to have certain corporate
acquisitions taxed as asset purchases rather than stock purchases. 17 These federal
tax elections and others are also available at the state level in many states, and like
in the case of a taxpayer’s itemization election, states differ as to whether they bind
taxpayers to their federal choices or allow independent state-level choices.18 Thus,
states’ tax election uniformity rules for each of these and other elections are likely
to affect the policy consequences of tax law changes that are relevant to taxpayers’
decisions about these elections.
The itemization election provided a good opportunity for an empirical study
of the effects of states’ tax election uniformity rules because the TCJA’s changes
were intended to alter taxpayers’ choices and because federal and state filing data
from before and after the TCJA were available. As a result, this example concretely
illustrates the previously underappreciated interactions between the federal and
state tax systems created by election uniformity rules. Insights from this Article’s
analysis of the itemization election can be leveraged in other situations, including
to help states determine which tax election uniformity rules to use for which
elections and to guide policymakers as they evaluate the policy implications of
many other tax law changes. For example, applying this Article’s insights reveals
that two recent federal tax law provisions enacted to help people weather the
pandemic likely provided different degrees of assistance to married couples in
different states depending on whether the states obligated couples to make the same
filing status choice (married filing jointly or separately) for state purposes as they
made for federal purposes.19 These types of issues will continue to arise over time,
including possibly in connection with future tax changes that may be forthcoming
under the Biden administration.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part I provides background about the
TCJA’s changes that affect taxpayers’ decisions about whether to itemize or take
the standard deduction. Part II discusses 2017 and 2018 income tax return data from
taxpayers in states that take different approaches to tax election uniformity. This
Part explains what the data reveal about how the TCJA’s itemization-related
changes affected taxpayers’ itemization choices. Part III uses the data discussed in
Part II to analyze how states’ election uniformity rules affected the simplification
achieved by the TCJA’s itemization-related changes. Part IV explains how this
Article’s insights about states’ tax election uniformity rules advance our
understanding of the relationship between the federal and state tax regimes more
broadly.

16

I.R.C. § 1362.
I.R.C. § 338(h)(10).
18
See infra Part IV.A.
19
Id.
17
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THE TCJA’S ITEMIZATION-RELATED CHANGES

The TCJA was the most sweeping tax reform legislation since 1986, and it
included major changes to the taxation of businesses, 20 cross-border activities,21
and individuals. For individuals, the TCJA reduced income tax rates, increased the
standard deduction, limited many itemized deductions, suspended personal and
dependency exemptions, increased the child tax credit, and reformed the individual
alternative minimum tax so that it applied to fewer taxpayers, among other
changes.22 According to the IRS, the TCJA’s increase to the standard deduction and
limits on itemized deductions (the “TCJA’s itemization-related changes”) are the
“most substantial changes [for individual taxpayers] introduced in the TCJA.”23
This Part provides more detail about these changes, explains the stated policy goal
behind them, and discusses their expected impact of the changes on itemization
rates and simplicity.
A. Increasing the Standard Deduction & Limiting Itemized
Deductions
The TCJA roughly doubled the standard deduction, from $6,350 to $12,000
for single taxpayers and from $12,700 to $24,000 for married taxpayers filing
jointly.24 In addition, the TCJA limited itemized deductions by imposing a $10,000
cap on the deduction for state and local taxes, 25 reducing the home mortgage
interest deduction, 26 limiting the deductibility of personal casualty and theft
losses,27 and suspending the deductibility of miscellaneous itemized deductions. 28
By raising the standard deduction and reducing the availability of certain itemized
deductions,29 the TCJA generally increased the financial incentive for taxpayers to
take the standard deduction rather than itemizing their deductions. As a result, the
TCJA was expected to increase the percentage of taxpayers who take the standard
deduction.30
20

Business tax changes included reducing tax rates on corporations and on the income of
pass-through businesses, allowing 100% bonus depreciation, and repealing the corporate alternative
minimum tax. MOLLY F. SHERLOCK & DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RSCH. SERV., THE 2017 TAX
REVISION (P.L. 115-97): COMPARISON TO 2017 TAX LAW 9, 18-40 (2018).
21
The TCJA moved the U.S. international tax system toward a territorial regime. Id. at 4149.
22
Id. at 8-19 (summarizing the individual tax provisions of the TCJA).
23
83 Fed. Reg. 34,698, 34,700 (July 20, 2018) (in the IRS’s request for comments on
revisions to the individual income tax forms for 2018).
24
Rev. Proc. 2016-55, 2016-45 I.R.B. 432 (stating the inflation-adjusted standard
deduction for 2017); I.R.C. § 63(c)(7); Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11021, 131 Stat.
2054, 2072-73 (stating the standard deductions for 2018).
25
Act of Dec. 22, 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11042, 131 Stat. at 2085-86.
26
Id. § 11043, 131 Stat. at 2086-87.
27
Id. § 11044, 131 Stat. at 2087-88.
28
Id. § 11045, 131 Stat. at 2088.
29
The TCJA also suspended section 68’s overall limitation on itemized deductions, which
actually increases, rather than reduces, the availability of itemized deductions. § 11046, 131 Stat. at
2088.
30
See infra Part I.C.
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B. The Stated Policy Goal: Simplification
Simplifying the income tax system for individuals and families was a key
goal motivating the TCJA’s individual income tax changes.31 Proponents of these
changes touted that the TCJA would bring “unprecedented simplicity” for
families.32 They said that “[d]oubling the standard deduction . . . helps make the tax
code so straightforward that 9 out of 10 Americans will be able to file on a form as
simple as a postcard,”33 and they promised that the TCJA would make the formcompleting tasks easier for American families. 34 Advocates explained that “fewer
taxpayers [will] need to go through the trouble of determining whether they should
itemize,” 35 indicating a desire to reduce individual taxpayers’ record-keeping
obligations and the number of decisions taxpayers must make when preparing their
returns. In addition, proponents explained that the benefits of this simplification
included reducing taxpayers’ out-of-pocket costs of filing (for example, because
taxpayers would no longer need to hire “an army of lawyers and accountants”) 36
and reducing taxpayers’ other costs of the filing process, including the “hassle” 37
and “aggravation of itemizing.”38
This commentary suggests that, when increasing the standard deduction and
limiting itemized deductions, lawmakers were primarily concerned about
compliance complexity, 39 which involves “the problems faced by the taxpayer in
31
TREASURY DEP’T, UNIFIED FRAMEWORK FOR FIXING OUR BROKEN TAX CODE 2-6
(2017) (emphasizing the goal of simplifying the tax system for families and individuals). Indeed,
the Conference Report accompanying the final bill lists the increase to the standard deduction and
the limits on itemized deductions, among other changes, as provisions that provide “simplification”
for individual taxpayers. H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 191, 256 (2017) (Conf. Rep.). Additional TCJA
changes that the Conference Report listed as simplifying included reduction of individual income
tax rates and the reform to the individual alternative minimum tax, among others. Id. at 191, 225.
32
H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, THE TAX CUTS & JOBS ACT: COMMUNICATIONS AND
POLICY DETAILS, at ii (quoting Chairman Kevin Brady).
33
Id. at 8.
34
See, e.g., Out with the Old, in with the New: Tax Cuts and Reforms That Look Out for
Hardworking Taxpayers, TRUMP WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (Apr. 17, 2018) [hereinafter Out with the
Old], https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefings-statements/old-new-tax-cuts-reforms-lookhardworking-taxpayers/ [https://perma.cc/C5C9-8LH5].
35
H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, supra note 32, at 15.
36
Out with the Old, supra note 34; see also Donald J. Trump, Remarks at Loren Cook
Company in Springfield, Missouri (Aug. 30, 2017).
37
Saying Goodbye to an Outdated Tax Code, TRUMP WHITE HOUSE ARCHIVES (Apr. 17,
2018) (quoting Speaker Paul Ryan), https://trumpwhitehouse.archives.gov/briefingsstatements/saying-goodbye-outdated-tax-code/ [https://perma.cc/7R3C-SVRA].
38
H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, supra note 32, at 8.
39
Simplicity is not a particularly simple concept. There is voluminous scholarship about
the meaning and importance of simplicity, and its opposite, complexity. See, e.g., DAVID F.
BRADFORD, UNTANGLING THE INCOME TAX (1986); Rosemary Marcuss et al., Income Taxes and
Compliance Costs: How Are They Related?, 66 NAT’L TAX J. 833 (2013); Edward J. McCaffery,
The Holy Grail of Tax Simplification, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 1267, 1270-71; N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N,
REPORT ON SIMPLIFICATION OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE 2-6 (2002) (quoting OMB as saying
“tax simplification is not simple” and providing an overview of complexity); Deborah H. Schenk,
Simplification for Individual Taxpayers: Problems and Proposals, 45 TAX L. REV. 121, 123 (1989);
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keeping records, choosing forms, making necessary calculations and so on.” 40
Legislators appeared less concerned with rule complexity (“the problems of
interpreting the written and unwritten rules”)41 and transactional complexity (“the
problems faced by taxpayers in organizing their affairs so as to minimize their taxes
within the framework of the rules”).42
C. Expectations About Itemization Rates and Simplification
When evaluating the probable simplifying effect of the TCJA’s itemizationrelated changes, much of the focus was on the expected decline in federal
itemization rates. For example, the Joint Committee on Taxation’s analysis of
expected tax complexity associated with the TCJA’s itemization-related changes
estimated that “approximately 94-percent of taxpayers will claim the standard
deduction under the bill, up from approximately 70-percent under [2017] law.”43

Kathleen DeLaney Thomas, User-Friendly Taxpaying, 92 IND. L.J. 1509 (2017); see also STAFF OF
J. COMM. ON TAXATION, 107TH CONG., JCS-3-01, STUDY OF THE OVERALL STATE OF THE FEDERAL
INCOME TAX SYSTEM AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR SIMPLIFICATION, PURSUANT TO SECTION
8022(3)(B) OF THE INTERNAL REVENUE CODE OF 1986 (Comm. Print. 2001) (providing a
comprehensive analysis of tax complexity).
40
BRADFORD, supra note 39, at 266-67; see also McCaffery, supra note 39, at 1270-72
(defining compliance complexity as the complexity “relat[ing] to the variety of record-keeping and
form-completing tasks a taxpayer must perform in order to comply with the tax laws”); N.Y. STATE
BAR ASS’N, supra note 39, at 3-4. Lawrence Zelenak separates out computational complexity, which
is often lumped together with compliance complexity. LAWRENCE ZELENAK, LEARNING TO LOVE
FORM 1040: TWO CHEERS FOR THE RETURN-BASED MASS INCOME TAX 113 (2013).
41
BRADFORD, supra note 39, at 266-67; see also McCaffery, supra note 39, at 1270-72
(discussing the similar concept of “technical complexity”); N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 39,
at 4-6 (parsing rule complexity further into technical complexity and interpretational complexity).
42
BRADFORD, supra note 39, at 266-67; see also N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, supra note 39, at
6. Kathleen DeLaney Thomas parses complexity differently, into substantive complexity
(“complexity in the tax rules makes it difficult for taxpayers to comprehend those rules”) and
procedural complexity (“any type of complexity that involves burdensome or numerous processes
or steps”). Thomas, supra note 39, at 1516-17. Under Thomas’s parsing, lawmakers, when
discussing the TCJA’s itemization-related changes, appeared more concerned about procedural
complexity than substantive complexity.
43
H.R. REP. NO. 115-446, at 67 (2017) (Conf. Rep.) (part of the JCT’s Tax Complexity
Analysis). The JCT published a more refined analysis in April 2018 with slightly different numbers,
estimating that the number of returns with itemized deductions would fall from approximately 46.5
million for the 2017 tax year to approximately 18 million for the 2018 tax year. STAFF OF J. COMM.
ON TAXATION, TABLES RELATED TO THE FEDERAL TAX SYSTEM AS IN EFFECT 2017 THROUGH 2026,
JCX-32-18, at 6 (2018). This means that the JCT expected 88-90% of taxpayers to claim the standard
deduction in 2018, up from approximately 70% under pre-TCJA law.
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The IRS and the CBO made similar predictions about the expected decline in the
number of itemizers,44 as did tax policy commentators.45
The Joint Committee on Taxation also qualitatively explained why a
decline in itemization rates was expected to reduce complexity:
Some taxpayers who currently itemize deductions may respond to
the provision by claiming the increased standard deduction in lieu
of itemizing. . . . These taxpayers will no longer have to file schedule
A to Form 1040, a significant number of which will no longer need
to engage in the record keeping inherent in itemizing below-the-line
deductions. . . . This reduction in complexity and record keeping
also may result in a decline in the number of individuals using a tax
preparation service, or tax preparation software, or a decline in the
cost of such service or software. The provision [increasing the
standard deduction] should also reduce the number of disputes
between taxpayers and the IRS regarding the substantiation of
itemized deductions. 46
D. The Decline in Itemization Rates as a Proxy for Simplification
The JCT’s analysis, discussed above, used the decline in itemization rates
as a proxy for simplification, and many others did the same. The rest of this Article
also uses data about changes in itemization rates to analyze the simplifying effect
of the TCJA’s itemization-related changes. Thus, before proceeding to the data and
analysis, it is important to examine the extent to which a decline in itemization rates
is a good proxy for simplification.
When doing so, this Part considers simplification for both taxpayers and tax
authorities. Although commentators discussing the TCJA focused on simplification
for taxpayers, 47 it is well-accepted that simplicity for the government when
44
CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, THE BUDGET AND ECONOMIC OUTLOOK: 2018 TO 2028, at 24,
112 (2018) (“a higher standard deduction for personal income taxes will reduce by more than 50
percent the number of households who find it advantageous to itemize their deductions. . . . the
combination of the higher standard deduction and the restrictions on [itemized deductions will
reduce] the number of taxpayers itemizing deductions . . . from 49 million in 2017 to 18 million in
2018.”); 83 Fed. Reg. 34,698, 34,700 (July 20, 2018) (“the increase in the standard deduction and
the limitation on the Schedule A tax deductions, taken together, . . . are expected to decrease the
number of Schedule A filed from 46 million to 20 million”).
45
See, e.g., Impact on the Number of Itemizers of H.R.1, The Tax Cuts & Jobs Act (TCJA),
by Expanded Cash Income Level, 2018, TAX POL’Y CTR. (Jan. 11, 2018),
https://www.taxpolicycenter. org/model-estimates/impact-itemized-deductions-tax-cuts-and-jobsact-jan-2018/t18-0001-impact-number [https://perma.cc/JJ5R-F34A] (using a simulation model to
predict that the number of itemizers would drop from approximately 46.5 million in 2017 to
approximately 19.3 million in 2018).
46
H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 676-77 (2017) (Conf. Rep.). JCT also briefly addressed the
likely impact on the government, explaining that the government would face short-term
complications because the IRS would need to publish new forms, publications, and withholding
tables to reflect the new individual income tax provisions.
47
The rhetoric surrounding the TCJA’s individual income tax changes generally omits
discussions about the complexity faced by the IRS (e.g., when processing returns, enforcing the tax
laws, and assisting taxpayers). See supra Part I.B.
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administering and enforcing tax laws (often referred to as “administrability”) is an
important part of understanding simplification. 48 Thus, this Article considers
simplification for both taxpayers and tax authorities. Ultimately, this Part explains
that the decline in itemization rates is a better proxy for simplification experienced
by tax authorities than for simplification experienced by taxpayers.
1. For Taxpayers
The decline in itemization rates may not be a particularly good proxy for
the simplification experienced by taxpayers. Itemizing entails several steps for
taxpayers, including keeping records of potential itemized deductions, analyzing
whether those deductions are allowed, computing the amount of allowed itemized
deductions, deciding whether to itemize, completing and submitting the relevant
form if they decide to itemize, dealing with a possible audit of their itemized
deductions, and planning ahead about itemizing to minimize their tax liability over
multiple years. Switching from itemizing to taking the standard deduction
simplifies some of these steps but not others. Indeed, many commentators
discussing the TCJA’s itemization-related changes expressed doubts about whether
reduced itemization would confer material simplification benefits. 49 This was
because, among other reasons, taxpayers still “have to do the math to determine if
they should itemize,” meaning that much of the simplification benefit of switching
to the standard deduction would be “illusory.”50
If a taxpayer does not itemize, they51 clearly do not need to complete or
submit a Schedule A with their federal income tax returns. In addition, if a taxpayer
See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, UNDERSTANDING THE TAX REFORM
DEBATE 49-52 (2005) (discussing administrability); JOHN GUYTON ET AL., TAX COMPLIANCE
BURDEN 1 (2018) (explaining two sides to tax compliance burden: “the burden experienced by
taxpayers and the administrative costs incurred by the IRS to administer the tax code”); McCaffery,
supra note 39, at 1272 (explaining that simplicity and complexity can also be evaluated from
different perspectives, including the perspective of “the taxpayer, the tax preparer, the tax planner
or advisor, the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the courts, the tax legislative system, academics or
economists”); Joel Slemrod, Optimal Tax Simplification: Toward a Framework for Analysis, 76
PROC. ANN. CONF. ON TAX’N NAT’L TAX ASS’N 158 (1983) (“characterize[ing] a tax system's
simplicity by the value of the resources that are expended in complying with the law and enforcing
the law.”).
49
See, e.g., Omri Marian, We Have Been Promised a Postcard. We Didn’t Get a Postcard.,
AM. ENTERPRISE INST. (Nov. 4, 2019) https://www.aei.org/economics/we-have-been-promised-apost card-we-didnt-get-a-post card/ [https://perma.cc/L49B-5VT2]. Commentators also discussed
the simplifying or complexifying impact that other TCJA provisions would have on individual
taxpayers. This Article, however, focuses on evaluating the simplification impact of only provisions
that were intended to simplify.
50
Daniel Shefter, Tax Reform: We Could Have Done So Much Better!, 158 TAX NOTES
389, 390 (Jan. 15, 2018).
51
This Article uses the epicene singular “they” to refer to individual (singular) taxpayers
in a gender-neutral way. See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/ they [https://perma.cc/36FR-VMPY] (providing that one definition of
“they” is as a pronoun that is “used with a singular antecedent to refer to an unknown or unspecified
person”);
ABA
STYLE,
Singular
“They”
https://apastyle.apa.org/style-grammarguidelines/grammar/singular-they [https:// perma.cc/YE54-R5A9] (endorsing the use of the singular
“they” as part of APA Style and explaining the singular “they” is used “as a generic third-person
48
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takes the standard deduction, there is no risk of a dispute with the IRS about their
itemized deductions. Thus, these sources of complexity are eliminated for any
taxpayer who switches from itemizing to taking the standard deduction.
A taxpayer who switched to the standard deduction after the TCJA,
however, might still have kept records of their possible itemized deductions,
analyzed whether each potential itemized deduction was allowed, computed their
total amount of itemized deductions allowed, and compared that total to the
standard deduction, before determining that the standard deduction was larger than
their itemized deductions and opting to take the standard deduction. Thus, even if
a taxpayer did not itemize, those preliminary steps, if taken, may have required
significant time and effort for the taxpayer, especially if they prepared their returns
themselves. The time spent on these steps was almost certainly lower for the ~95%
of taxpayers who use a tax preparer or tax return software52 because the preparer or
the software generally does most of the analysis. However, even taxpayers who use
software or a tax preparer might have spent time and effort collecting records of
their possible itemized deductions. Admittedly, some taxpayers might have skipped
the preliminary steps and taken the standard deduction without analyzing their
possible itemized deductions. For these taxpayers, taking the standard deduction
was likely quite simple. The number of taxpayers who take this simpler approach
should grow over time if, as taxpayers adjust to post-TCJA law, they grow
increasingly confident that they will continue to take the standard deduction.
Nevertheless, it is likely that some taxpayers who itemized deductions for 2017 and
took the standard deduction for 2018 continued to do the record-keeping and
analysis for 2018 to determine whether they should take the standard deduction. It
is, however, difficult to know which taxpayers who switched to the standard
deduction took which approach to recordkeeping and analysis of their possible
itemized deductions. Thus, although the decline in the federal itemization rate
suggests at least some reduction in compliance complexity for some taxpayers, it is
difficult to rely on itemization rates to draw conclusions about the degree of
simplification experienced by taxpayers who switched to the standard deduction.
In addition, the TCJA’s itemization-related changes may increase
transactional complexity for taxpayers. 53 This is because taxpayers might, for
example, plan to bunch itemized deductions (particularly charitable contributions)
into a single year to maximize their total deductions over a two-year period.54 This
could be a useful strategy particularly for taxpayers whose annual itemized
deductions (without bunching) would otherwise be close to, but somewhat below,
the federal standard deduction. Given the TCJA’s increase to the standard

singular pronoun to refer to a person whose gender is unknown or irrelevant to the context of the
usage”).
52
83 Fed. Reg. 34,698, 34,700 (July 20, 2018).
53
See supra notes 37, 38, 40 and accompanying text.
54
See, e.g., Will Tax Reform Affect Your Charitable Deduction? What You Need to Know,
FIDELITY CHARITABLE (July 15, 2020), https://www.fidelitycharitable.org/articles/will-tax-reformaffect-your-charitable-deduction.html [https://perma.cc/L4YE-FPP3] (recommending bunching
charitable contributions post-TCJA to minimize overall tax liability).

2021]

TAXPAYER CHOICES

13

deduction, more taxpayers likely can minimize their overall tax liability through
this type of planning.55
Thus, although itemization rates may provide some insight into tax
complexity experienced by taxpayers, the decline in federal itemization rates
between 2017 and 2018 is only a weak proxy for the simplifying effect of the
TCJA’s itemization-related changes.56
There are other ways to try to measure simplification. 57 For example, the
IRS also tried to quantify the expected simplifying effects of the TCJA’s
itemization-related changes using the “Income Taxpayer Burden Model” (ITBM).
The ITBM is “a microsimulation model developed jointly by IBM and the IRS to
estimate the amount of time and money that individuals spend on federal tax
compliance.”58 The model relies on both IRS data and data gathered from surveys
of taxpayers and paid tax professionals, about taxpayers’ tax-related activities,
compliance methods, and time and money spent on tax compliance. 59 The survey
seeks to capture the time and money spent by taxpayers on activities that are part
of the return preparation process, even if those activities do not result in actual
filings (e.g., of a Schedule A).60 Using the ITBM, the IRS estimated that the “drop
in Schedule A filings and the elimination of certain Schedule A line items [was]
expected to lead to a decrease of 241,000,000 hours and a decrease of
$2,948,000,000 in out-of-pocket costs” for taxpayers. 61 The ITBM, however,
55

A taxpayer pursuing this strategy would likely vacillate between itemizing and taking
the standard deduction for federal purposes, so this effect may be difficult to pick up in aggregate
itemization data from the IRS.
56
Nevertheless, many commentators implicitly use the decline in federal itemization rates
as a proxy for simplification, particularly in the context of broader discussions about the TCJA. See,
e.g., William G. Gale et al., Effects of the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act: A Preliminary Analysis, TAX
POLICY CTR. 17 (June 13, 2018) (“TCJA will simplify taxes in . . . [that] the number of people who
itemize their deductions will decline significantly because of the increases in the standard deduction
and the reduction or elimination of certain itemized deductions” but also highlighting how the TCJA
increase complexity); Stephen J. Pieklik et al., Deducting Success: Congressional Policy Goals and
the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, 16 PITT. TAX REV. 1, 27-29 (2018) (“Congress was both
successful and unsuccessful in meeting its goal of simplifying the tax system” – successful in that
the TCJA “makes paying taxes simpler for the vast majority of taxpayers because these taxpayers
are likely to utilize the standard deduction” but unsuccessful because of changes unrelated to
itemization).
57
Commentators have used various other approaches to try to estimate the impact of tax
changes on simplification. See, e.g., JASON J. FICHTNER, BIPARTISAN POLICY CTR., TAX
ADMINISTRATION:
COMPLIANCE,
COMPLEXITY,
AND
CAPACITY
6-8
(2019),
https://bipartisanpolicy.org/wp-content/
uploads/2019/04/Tax-Administration-ComplianceComplexity-Capacity.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 7MDB-3DLS] (citing studies using different
approaches); JASON J. FITCHNER & JACOB M. FELDMAN, MERCATUS CTR., THE HIDDEN COSTS OF
TAX COMPLIANCE (2013).
58
Guyton et al., Estimating the Compliance Cost of the U.S. Individual Income Tax, 56
NAT’L TAX J. 673 (2003) (explaining how the ITBM works).
59
Id.
60
See, e.g., IRS, SAMPLE INDIVIDUAL TAXPAYER BURDEN SURVEY FOR 2018 (2019)
(question 3, for example, which asks about recordkeeping regardless of whether taxpayer used the
records).
61
IRS, OMB CONTROL NO. 1545-0074, SUPPORTING STATEMENT A, U.S. INDIVIDUAL
INCOME
TAX
RETURN
33
(2018),
https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewDocument?ref_nbr=201808-1545-031
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remains subject to many limitations, 62 but it is one way to study an aspect of
simplification that a mere decline in the number of itemizers cannot capture—time
and effort invested in the process of determining whether to itemize or take the
standard deduction. Moreover, the IRS’s use of the ITBM as an alternative method
of measuring simplification supports the conclusion that the decline in itemization
rates may not be the best proxy for the simplification experienced by taxpayers as
a result of the TCJA’s itemization-related changes.
2. For Tax Authorities
In contrast, the decline in itemization rates is likely a reasonably good proxy
for the long-term simplification experienced by tax authorities. The TCJA’s
itemization-related changes did add some short-term complications for the IRS
because the IRS needed to revise forms, instructions, publications, and other
materials to reflect the changes in the law before taxpayers filed their returns. After
taxpayers filed their returns, however, the decline in itemization rates simplified the
IRS’s post-filing responsibilities for at least two reasons. First, there were almost
30 million fewer Schedule A forms that needed to be processed in 2018 as
compared to 2017. Processing fewer forms is easier and presumably saved the IRS
time and money. Second, with almost 30 million fewer Schedule A forms filed in
2018, there were fewer taxpayers whose itemized deductions might need auditing
and thus fewer opportunities for disputes about itemized deductions. Given that
“itemized deductions reported on Schedule A of IRS Form 1040 have been among
the [National Taxpayer Advocate’s list of] ten Most Litigated Issues” in recent
years, 63 changes that dramatically reduce the number of taxpayers who itemize
deductions should also reduce audits and disputes related to itemized deductions,
thereby simplifying the IRS’s work. The enforcement resources otherwise spent on
these tasks can be saved and reallocated for other tax administration uses. These
simplification benefits for the IRS are likely to continue for years, as long as the
TCJA’s itemization-related changes persist enough to keep itemization rates down.
Thus, a decline in itemization rates represents a real decline in the IRS resources
spent administering one part of the individual income tax.

[https://perma.cc/FC83-W324] (included in the Information Collection Review (ICR) submitted to
Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) in connection with OIRA’s review of the
revised U.S. Individual Tax Return).
62
See GUYTON, supra note 48; Guyton, supra note 58; Janet Holtzblatt, Measuring
Compliance Burdens: Issues Raised by the Individual Taxpayer Burden Model, 97 PROC. ANN.
CONF. ON TAX’N NAT’L TAXPAYER ASS’N 366 (2004). This scholarship identifies many concerns
including, for example, that data are based on a survey of taxpayers, and although the survey is
completed relatively close in time to when taxpayers file, the taxpayers may still be subject to recall
bias.
63
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2018 (2019); NAT’L
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 2019 (2020).
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II.
USING TAX FILING DATA TO UNDERSTAND CHANGES IN
TAXPAYERS’ ITEMIZATION CHOICES
With an understanding of what a decline in itemization rates does (and does
not) mean about simplification, this Part delves into the data about itemization
before and after the TCJA. This Part first examines how federal itemization rates
changed after the TCJA. Then, this Part adds state itemization data to the analysis
to understand how (and why) federal and state itemization rates vary by state.
A. Federal Itemization Data
Filing data from the 2017 and 2018 tax years are consistent with the
predictions that federal itemization rates would decline after the TCJA. For the
2017 tax year, 30.6% of tax returns itemized deductions, whereas for the 2018 tax
year, only 11.4% itemized deductions. 64 Almost 30 million fewer tax returns
itemized deductions in 2018 than in 2017.
As illustrated in Figure 1, federal itemization rates declined in all income
categories, although the magnitude of the impact varied by income category. 65

64

SOI Tax Stats - Individual Income Tax Returns Complete Report (Publication 1304),
IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns-publication-1304complete-report [https://perma.cc/R76L-355V] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021) (Table 1.4. All Returns:
Sources of Income, Adjustments, and Tax Items, by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Tax Year 2017
& Tax Year 2018). The SOI also published data broken down by state. IRS Statistics on Income,
Individual Income and Tax Data, by State and Size of AGI (Tax Year 2017 & Tax Year 2018). The
aggregated nationwide numbers of returns and returns with itemized deductions are slightly different
in the different sources, as follows:
Total # of
Returns

# of Returns
with Itemized
Deductions

% of Returns
with Itemized
Deductions

Publication 1304 (Table 1.4)
(SOI Complete Report)
TY2017
TY2018

152,903,231
153,774,296

46,852,675
17,532,592

30.6%
11.4%

SOI State-by-State Data
TY2017
TY2018

152,455,900
153,455,990

47,103,650
17,599,150

30.9%
11.5%

Decline in
# of
Itemizers

Decline in
Itemization
Rate (as a %
of 2017 Rate)

29,320,083

62.8%

29,504,500

62.9%

The numbers are quite close, but this Article, when reporting aggregate nationwide data,
will rely on the data from Publication 1304 because the state-by-state data are rounded.
65
SOI Tax Stats – Individual Income Tax Returns Complete Report (Publication 1304),
IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-individual-income-tax-returns-publication-1304complete-report [https://perma.cc/R76L-355V] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021) (Table 1.4. All Returns:
Sources of Income, Adjustments, and Tax Items, by Size of Adjusted Gross Income, Tax Year 2017
& Tax Year 2018) and author calculations.
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% of Federal Returns
With Itemized Deductions

Figure 1. Federal Itemization Rates by AGI & Tax Year
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Very few lower-income taxpayers itemized before or after the TCJA, but of
those who did itemize in 2017, a large percentage switched to the standard
deduction for 2018. 66 A substantial percentage of middle- and upper-middleincome taxpayers also switched from itemizing in 2017 to taking the standard
deduction in 2018. In contrast, although some of the highest-income taxpayers
switched to the standard deduction, their post-TCJA itemization rates remained
quite high.67
B. A Closer Look at the Data: Variation in Itemization Rates by State
Federal itemization rates vary not only by income, but also by state. In 2017,
federal itemization rates for taxpayers in different states ranged from a low of
17.4% (in West Virginia) to a high of 46.7% (in Maryland), with a median of
29.2%. 68 There are many reasons for this state-to-state variation in federal
itemization behavior, including differences in income and wealth across states, state
and local tax levels, home ownership rates, and home prices. 69
In addition, state itemization rates vary by state among those states with an
income tax. There are many possible explanations for this variation as well,
66

This is not surprising because the higher post-TCJA standard deduction is larger relative
to the income of a lower-income taxpayer.
67
This is also not surprising because high-income taxpayers are most likely to have
itemized deductions (especially mortgage interest deductions and deductions for charitable
donations) in excess of the standard deduction.
68
See Appendix A showing the 2017 and 2018 federal itemization rates for every state.
69
The deductions for state and local taxes and home mortgage interest were two of the top
three most commonly taken itemized deductions before the TCJA (taken by >97% and >70% of
2017 itemizers respectively), and all continued to be taken at high rates in 2018. IRS, INDIVIDUAL
INCOME TAX RETURN LINE-ITEM ESTIMATES 2017, PUB. 4801, at 32 (2019), and author calculations.
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including the factors listed above, differences in state laws regarding which
expenditures are deductible (i.e., whether state tax law conforms to federal tax law),
and differences in the size of states’ standard deductions. Several states made
changes to their tax laws in response to the TCJA, particularly with respect to
conformity and the size of the state’s standard deduction. 70 For example, some
states (e.g., Missouri) increased their standard deductions to match the large postTCJA federal standard deduction. 71 The standard deduction in most other states
(e.g., Oregon, Maryland, and Nebraska) increased but remained significantly lower
than the post-TCJA federal standard deduction, although the magnitude of the gap
between federal and state standard deduction varied. Table 1 provides pre- and postTCJA standard deductions for these states as examples, along with the federal
standard deduction amounts for comparison.
Table 1. Standard Deductions Pre- and Post-TCJA: Federal and Select States

Federal
State
Missouri72
Nebraska73
Oregon74
Maryland75

Standard Deduction for
Single Taxpayers
2017
2018
$6,350
$12,000
$6,350
$6,350
$2,175
Max of $2,000

$12,000
$6,750
$2,215
Max of $2,250

Standard Deduction for
Married Taxpayers Filing Jointly
2017
2018
$12,700
$24,000
$12,700
$12,700
$4,350
Max of $4,000

$24,000
$13,500
$4,435
Max of $4,500

One additional factor that can affect both the federal itemization rate and
the state itemization rate for a state’s taxpayers is whether the state requires election
uniformity. That is, does the state obligate its taxpayers to make the same
itemization decision for state purposes as the taxpayer made for federal purposes?
Very generally, states take three different approaches to election uniformity. Some
states, including Georgia and Virginia, require taxpayers to make completely
70

See Walczak, supra note 8 (summarizing states’ conformity changes in response to the

TCJA).
71

Compare 2018 Missouri Income Tax Reference Guide 7 (2018) with 2017 Missouri
Income Tax Reference Guide 8 (2017). The state standard deduction increases beyond the federal
amount for taxpayers over age 65.
72
Id.
73
Chronological History of Nebraska Tax Rates, NEB. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://revenue.
nebraska.gov/sites/revenue.nebraska.gov/files/doc/research/chronology/4-607table1.pdf [https://
perma.cc/NJX9-VNUY] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021) (listing income tax rate data, income tax
bracket data, and standard deduction amounts by year).
74
Compare OR. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 2017 OREGON INCOME TAX FULL-YEAR RESIDENT,
PUB. OR-40-FY at 15 (2018) with OR. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 2018 OREGON INCOME TAX FULL-YEAR
RESIDENT, PUB. OR-40-FY at 15 (2019).
75
COMPTROLLER OF MD., MARYLAND 2017 STATE & LOCAL TAX FORMS & INSTRUCTIONS
12
(2018),
https://www.marylandtaxes.gov/forms/17_forms/Resident_Booklet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ C59F-KEM8]; COMPTROLLER OF MD., MARYLAND 2018 STATE & LOCAL TAX
FORMS
&
INSTRUCTIONS
12
(2019),
https://www.marylandtaxes.gov/forms/18_forms/Resident_Booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q8F4ZH59].
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uniform federal and state itemization decisions: if a taxpayer itemizes for federal
purposes, they must itemize for state purposes as well, and if a taxpayer takes the
standard deduction for federal purposes, they must take the standard deduction for
state purposes too. 76 These states are shown with horizontal stripes on Figure 2
below. Other states, including Nebraska and Maryland, require partial election
uniformity. In these states, taxpayers who take the standard deduction for federal
purposes must also take the standard deduction for state purposes, but taxpayers
who itemize for federal purposes can make an independent choice for state
purposes. These states are shown with vertical stripes in Figure 2 below. Yet other
states, including Oregon and California, allow taxpayers to make fully independent
state itemization decisions. These taxpayers can make the election that is best for
them for state purposes without regard to what election they made for federal
purposes. These states are shown with dots in Figure 2 below. States shaded dark
gray do not allow state itemized deductions, and states shaded light gray do not
have a broad-based state personal income tax.
Figure 2. Itemization Election Uniformity Laws by State (2018)77

76

Some states, such as Georgia that require complete election uniformity do so by
explicitly requiring that taxpayers make the same choice for state tax purposes. GA. CODE ANN. §487-27(a) (2019) (using federal AGI as the conformity starting point, and then allowing a subtraction
for itemized deductions if the taxpayer itemized for federal purposes and otherwise allowing a
standard deduction). Other states, such as Colorado, use federal taxable income as their conformity
starting point, thereby building in the taxpayer’s federal itemization choice for purposes of their
state tax determination. COLO. REV. STAT. § 39-22-104(1.7) (2019).
77
Map created by author using mapchart.net and research about state income taxes. State
tax forms; RIA Checkpoint, State Tax Chart 56,000 (Conformity Starting Point), 56950 (Itemized
Deduction). See Appendix A for more details about each state’s itemization uniformity rule.
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The remainder of this Part analyzes the pre- and post-TCJA itemization
rates of taxpayers in states with different approaches to itemization election
uniformity. Oregon is used as the example of a state that allows independent
itemization choices (i.e., states with dots), and Nebraska and Maryland are used as
examples of states that require some degree of election uniformity (i.e., states with
stripes).78 These three states are used as case studies for three reasons. First, their
state income tax laws largely conform to federal individual income tax laws, which
allows the analysis to focus primarily on the impact of the election uniformity
choice (rather than on differences between federal and state income tax laws
regarding, for example, what deductions are allowed).79 Second, these states did
not change their approach to itemization election uniformity between 2017 and
2018.80 Third, state-level itemization data for both 2017 and 2018 were available
78

These states take the same approach—requiring taxpayers who take the standard
deduction for federal purposes to take the standard deduction for state purposes. However, both are
included because their state standard deductions and state itemization data are quite different.
Readers may notice that this discussion does not include an example of a state that fully binds a
taxpayer to their federal itemization deductions (i.e., states with vertical stripes). This is primarily
because of the unavailability of state-level itemization data from these states. However, analyzing
Nebraska’s and Maryland’s data provides insight into the consequences for all taxpayers who, postTCJA, prefer to take the standard deduction for federal purposes but prefer to itemize for state
purposes. For taxpayers with these preferences, the analysis is the same regardless of whether they
are in a state that fully binds taxpayers or a state that binds taxpayers only to the federal standard
deduction. The taxpayers omitted by this analysis are those who, post-TCJA, prefer to itemize for
federal purposes but take the standard deduction for state purposes. Taxpayers in states like
Nebraska and Maryland are allowed to act on these preferences, but in states that fully bind
taxpayers to their federal itemization choices, the taxpayer may not itemize for federal purposes and
take the standard deduction for state purposes. However, the taxpayers who would want to do that
are practically a null set, so little is lost by omitting an example of a state that requires complete
uniformity. Thus, this Article, when referring to states that bind taxpayers to their federal elections,
will also include states that bind taxpayers only to federal standard deduction, because it is binding
to the federal standard deduction that is the part of the election uniformity rule with the most
potentially significant impact post-TCJA.
79
For 2018, all three states generally conformed to the individual income tax changes made
by the TCJA. In Oregon and Maryland, the primary disconformity with the IRC for individual
income taxes was that they do not allow a state deduction for state income tax (or, in Maryland
income tax paid to a locality). OR. REV. STAT. § 316.695(1)(d) (2019); MD. CODE ANN. TAX-GEN.
§ 10-218 (2017). In Nebraska, no state or local taxes at all (including non-income taxes) are
deductible for state income tax purposes. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-2716.01(3) (2018). In contrast,
California is not discussed because it generally conforms to the IRC as of Jan. 1, 2015 (i.e., to very
dated law). CAL. REVENUE & TAXATION CODE § 17024.5 (2019). In 2019, California adopted some
(but far from all) changes to conform with the TCJA but did not conform to the TCJA at all in 2018.
See Kathleen K. Wright, California Conformity to the TCJA (The “Light” Version of Conformity),
93 TAX NOTES ST. 405 (2019).
80
This is why New York is not discussed. New York taxpayers were bound to their federal
standard deductions for 2017 but allowed independent elections for 2018. See N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF
TAXATION & FIN., PRELIMINARY REPORT ON THE FEDERAL TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT (Jan. 2018),
https://www.tax.ny.gov/pdf/stats/stat_pit/pit/preliminary-report-tcja-2017.pdf
[https://perma.cc/
BMB9-F4B7] (explaining that absent change in New York’s 2017 itemization uniformity
requirement, the TCJA’s changes “would generate approximately $44 million in additional revenue”
for 2018 because more NY taxpayers would opt for the federal standard deduction, thus obligating
them to take the standard deduction for NY purposes too); N.Y. STATE, DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN.,
ITEMIZED DEDUCTIONS (2019), https://www.tax.ny.gov/pit/file/itemized-deductions-2018.htm
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for analysis. 81 For each example, the following discussion analyzes how the
TCJA’s itemization-related changes would, in theory, be expected to change
taxpayers’ itemization behavior 82 and compares those theoretical expectations to
data about actual changes in itemization behavior. Together, this analysis illustrates
that the TCJA’s itemization-related changes led to different results (not only for
state purposes, but also for federal purposes) for taxpayers in states depending on
each state’s itemization election uniformity rules.
1. Independent Itemization Elections Allowed: Oregon
Oregon is an example of a state that allows independent itemization
elections. 83 Taxpayers are free to itemize for Oregon state income tax purposes
even if they take the standard deduction for federal income tax purposes.
a. Change in Itemization Behavior of Oregon Taxpayers – Theory
Because Oregon does not require taxpayers to make uniform federal and
state itemization elections, Oregon taxpayers would be expected to analyze their
federal and state itemization elections separately. Then, they would make the
federal election that best reduces federal income tax liability and make the state
election that best reduces state income tax liability, even if the former and latter
differ. Neither election would obligate the taxpayer to make any particular choice
for the other election.84
Accordingly, Oregon taxpayers should be expected to make whatever
federal itemization choice best reduces their federal income taxes. Thus, the federal
itemization rate for Oregon taxpayers would be expected to drop significantly
[https://perma.cc/ZK3B-N4ZC] (“Beginning with tax year 2018, the Tax Law allows you to itemize
your deductions for New York State income tax purposes whether or not you itemized your
deductions on your federal income tax return.”); N.Y. STATE DEP’T OF TAXATION & FIN.,
TECHNICAL MEMORANDUM TSB-M-18(6)I – NEW YORK STATE DECOUPLES FROM CERTAIN
PERSONAL INCOME TAX INTERNAL REVENUE CODE (IRC) CHANGES FOR 2018 AND AFTER (2018).
Minnesota made a similar change between 2017 and 2018. MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, REVENUE
NOTICE #18-01: INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX – STANDARD DEDUCTION OR ELECTION TO ITEMIZE – TAX
YEAR 2018 (2018), https://www.revenue.state.mn.us/sites/default/files/2018-09/RN-18-01.pdf
[https://perma.cc/CF3S-4YHD] (explaining that prior to 2018, “[t]he computation of Minnesota
individual income tax . . . requires taxpayers to have a consistent election [with respect to itemizing
or taking the standard deduction] between their federal and state income tax returns” but that, “[f]or
taxable year 2018, taxpayers may either claim the standard deduction or elect to itemize deductions
on their 2018 Minnesota income tax return, regardless of the election made on their 2018 federal
income tax return”).
81
Federal itemization data for 2018 is available from the IRS SOI for taxpayers from all
states. However, state-level data is much harder to obtain because some states generally do not
provide such data or only do so on a very delayed basis.
82
This analysis uses a rational actor model, assuming that taxpayers make utilitymaximizing decisions, measuring utility in money.
83
Independent itemization elections are allowed for Oregon state purposes even though
Oregon’s starting point for conformity is federal taxable income. OR. REV. STAT. §§ 316.048,
316.695(1)(c)(A) (2019).
84
A taxpayer’s state itemization choice could, however, affect the taxpayer’s SALT
deduction for federal purposes, and thus affect the desirability of itemizing for federal purposes.
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between 2017 and 2018. This is because the TCJA’s dramatic increase in the federal
standard deduction likely led many more Oregon taxpayers to choose the standard
deduction for federal purposes in 2018 than in 2017. This decline in federal
itemization by Oregon taxpayers would likely be similar to the decline in federal
itemization by taxpayers nationwide.
The decline in federal itemization by Oregon taxpayers, however, would be
expected to have no effect on Oregon taxpayers’ itemization decisions for state
income tax purposes. Because Oregon allows independent state itemization
decisions, the expected change in taxpayers’ state itemization behavior should
depend primarily on which itemized deductions Oregon allows and on the size of
Oregon’s standard deduction. Oregon’s state income tax laws about itemized
deductions mirror the federal income tax laws with minimal exceptions. 85 As a
result, the TCJA’s limits on itemized deductions for federal purposes also limited
taxpayers’ itemized deductions for Oregon state purposes beginning in 2018.
However, Oregon’s standard deduction increased by less than 2% between 2017
and 2018.86 Thus, the financial incentive to itemize for Oregon state tax purposes
was largely unchanged between 2017 and 2018, except for the relatively small
number of taxpayers whose itemized deductions were significantly limited by
Oregon’s conformity to the TCJA’s limitations. Therefore, in contrast to the large
expected decline in the federal itemization rate by Oregon taxpayers, relatively
little change in the Oregon state itemization rate would be expected between 2017
and 2018.87
b. Change in Itemization Behavior of Oregon Taxpayers – Data
Federal and state individual income tax filing data from 2017 and 2018
provide insight into how actual taxpayer itemization behavior changed after the
TCJA, and the data reveal that the actual results match the theoretical expectations.
As Figure 3 shows, the percentage of Oregon taxpayers who itemized for federal
purposes declined dramatically between 2017 and 2018 (from 37.5% to 14.6%).88
This decline was similar in magnitude to the overall decline in federal itemization.89

85
Oregon is a static conformity state that regularly updates its conformity date. S.B. 1529,
79th Leg. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2018) updated Oregon’s conformity date to December 31, 2017,
effective for the 2018 tax year. Itemized deductions for Oregon purposes are the same as a taxpayer’s
federal itemized deductions except that Oregon income taxes are not deductible for Oregon state
purposes. OR. REV. STAT. § 316.695(1)(d) (2019).
86
See supra Table 1.
87
See OR. LEGISLATIVE REVENUE OFFICE, TAX CUTS AND JOBS ACT OF 2017 – AN UPDATE
18 (2018) (anticipating that Oregon state itemization rates would remain at approximately 47% and
anticipating that the share of Oregon taxpayers who itemize for federal purposes would decline from
approximately 40% in 2017 to 15% in 2018).
88
SOI Tax Stats – Historic Table, Individual Income and Tax Data, by State and Size of
Adjusted Gross Income, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-historic-table-2
[https://perma.cc/ YPZ4-NGJU] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021), and author calculations.
89
See supra Part II.A.
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In contrast, the percentage of Oregon taxpayers who itemized for Oregon state
purposes declined only slightly (from 46.2% to 43.3%).90

% of Returns with Itemized Deductions

Figure 3. TCJA's Impact on U.S. Itemization Rates
and on Federal & State Itemization Rates for Oregon
Taxpayers
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In absolute numbers, ~441,000 fewer income tax returns from Oregon
taxpayers itemized deductions for federal purposes for 2018 than for 2017. 91
However, the number of Oregon income tax returns that itemized deductions for
state purposes declined, between 2017 and 2018, by only ~37,000. 92 Thus,
~404,000 Oregon taxpayers continued, post-TCJA, to itemize for state income tax
purposes despite switching to the standard deduction for federal income tax
purposes. This represents more than 90% of Oregon taxpayers who switched to the
standard deduction for federal purposes93 and more than 22% of all Oregon state
individual income tax returns.94 Appendix B provides additional details about the
data.
In sum, the decline, between 2017 and 2018, in the percentage of Oregon
taxpayers who itemized for state tax purposes was much smaller than the decline in
the percentage of Oregon taxpayers who itemized for federal tax purposes. Thus,
the TCJA’s changes had a significant impact on the percentage of taxpayers who
itemized for federal purposes, but a very small impact on itemization rates for
90

Oregon
Personal
Income
Tax
Statistics,
OREGON.GOV,
https://www.oregon.gov/dor/programs/
gov-research/Pages/research-personal.aspx
[https://perma.cc/28CK-AZ62] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021), and author calculations.
91
See supra note 88.
92
See supra note 90.
93
404,000/441,000 = 91.6%
94
The exact percentage depends on which number is used for the denominator (i.e., federal
returns or state returns; 2017 returns or 2018 returns), but any denominator yields a percentage
greater than 22%. See Appendix B for more detailed numbers.
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Oregon state tax purposes. This disparity arose because some Oregon taxpayers
made different federal and state itemization choices, and that can only happen
because Oregon allows taxpayers to make independent state itemization choices.
2. Election Uniformity Required: Maryland & Nebraska
The results are quite different in states, such as Maryland and Nebraska, that
require taxpayers who take the standard deduction for federal purposes to take the
standard deduction for state purposes. In these states, a taxpayer can itemize for
state income tax purposes only if they itemize for federal income tax purposes.
a. Change in Itemization Behavior of Maryland and Nebraska
Taxpayers – Theory
To decide whether to itemize, a taxpayer in a state requiring itemization
election uniformity should determine which itemization choice minimizes their net
income tax liability.
For some of these taxpayers, one itemization choice may be tax-minimizing
for both federal and state purposes, in which case the choice is easy. If the federal
standard deduction exceeds the taxpayer’s federal itemized deductions and the state
standard deduction exceeds the taxpayer’s state itemized deductions, the taxpayer
should take the standard deduction for both federal and state purposes. Similarly, if
a taxpayer’s itemized deductions exceed both the state and federal standard
deductions, the taxpayer should itemize for both purposes.
Other taxpayers have conflicting itemization preferences—typically
preferring to take the standard deduction for federal purposes and to itemize for
state purposes.95 In states that require election uniformity, the taxpayers with this
set of conflicting federal/state itemization preferences must determine whether it is
tax minimizing, on net, to (1) itemize for federal purposes (even though their federal
standard deduction is larger) so they can also itemize for state purposes96 or (2) take
the standard deduction for federal purposes even though doing so requires them to
take the standard deduction for state purposes too (instead of taking their larger
95

See Walczak, supra note 8, at 18 (highlighting this possibility). Conflicting preferences
could be reversed, where a taxpayer prefers to itemize for federal purposes but take the standard
deduction for state purposes. However, that would be extremely unlikely, at least in states that
largely conform to federal tax law, because no state’s basic standard deduction exceeds the federal
standard deduction. See Morgan Scarboro, State Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for
2018, TAX FOUND. FISCAL FACT NO. 576 (2018); Katherine Loughead & Emma Wei, State
Individual Income Tax Rates and Brackets for 2019, TAX FOUND. FISCAL FACT NO. 643 (2019); see
also supra note 79.
96
H&R Block, for example, explicitly flags this possibility. See What is the Standard
Deduction
vs.
Itemized
Deduction?,
H&R
Block,
https://www.hrblock.com/taxcenter/filing/adjustments-and-deductions/standard-vs-itemized-deductions/
[https://perma.cc/ZW8Z-HPFT] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021) (“There’s one situation where you may
want to itemize deductions even if your total itemized deductions are less than your standard
deduction. You might want to do this if you’d pay less tax overall between your federal and state
taxes. This can happen if you itemize on your federal and state returns and get a larger tax benefit
than you would if you claimed the standard deduction on your federal and state returns.”).
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amount of state itemized deductions). 97 These taxpayers cannot make their
preferred itemization choice for both federal and state purposes. They must make a
single choice and either pay extra in state income tax to save even more in federal
income taxes, or vice versa. Ultimately, where a state requires itemization
uniformity, the tax minimizing choice, on net, is a function of (a) the taxpayer’s
federal marginal tax rate, (b) the amount of the taxpayer’s federal itemized
deductions, (c) the size of the federal standard deduction, (d) the taxpayer’s state
marginal tax rate, (e) the amount of the taxpayer’s state itemized deductions, and
(f) the size of the state standard deduction. 98
The TCJA’s dramatic increase in the size of the federal standard deduction
increased the net benefit to taxpayers of taking the standard deduction, thereby
increasing the economic incentive to take the standard deduction. Thus, the federal
itemization rates for taxpayers in Nebraska and Maryland should be much lower in
2018 than they were for those same taxpayers in 2017. 99 Because these states
require taxpayers to take the standard deduction for state purposes if they take the
standard deduction for federal purposes, an increase in the percentage of taxpayers
taking the standard deduction for federal purposes post-TCJA should also result in
a corresponding increase in the percentage of taxpayers taking the standard
deduction for state purposes. Thus, for taxpayers in Nebraska, Maryland and other
states that require election uniformity, both federal and state itemization rates
would be expected to decline after the TCJA, and the federal itemization rate of
each state’s taxpayers should be approximately equal to the state itemization rate.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, there is likely to be some variation in
itemization rates even among states with the same itemization election uniformity
rules. For example, Nebraska’s itemization rate in 2017 (~28%) was significantly
lower than Maryland’s (~46%). 100 Although both would be expected to decline
97

In states that bind taxpayers only to their federal standard deduction (rather than fully
binding them to their federal itemization choices), a taxpayer who prefers to itemize for federal
purposes and take the standard deduction for state purposes may do so.
98
Very generally, the following formula can be used to determine whether the taxpayer is
better off, on net, itemizing or taking the standard deduction, assuming that the federal choice is
binding for state purposes.
Benefit of itemizing for both Federal and State purposes =
State marginal tax rate * (State itemized deductions – State standard deduction)
+ Federal marginal tax rate * (Federal itemized deductions – Federal standard deduction)
If the benefit of itemizing is positive, itemization makes the taxpayer better off. If the
benefit of itemizing is negative, taking the standard deduction makes the taxpayer better off. This
formula does not consider how the itemization choice’s impact on state tax liability affects the
taxpayer’s SALT deduction and thus the taxpayer’s desire to itemize for federal purposes. That said,
this consideration may have a limited or even no effect if the taxpayer’s total state and local taxes
paid exceed the $10,000 cap. In addition, the formula could take account of the impact of the SALT
deduction with slightly more complex math.
99
Even pre-TCJA, taxpayers with conflicting federal/state itemization preferences in states
that required election uniformity may have opted to take the standard deduction for both federal and
state purposes. By increasing the standard deduction, limiting itemized deductions and lowering tax
rates, the TCJA likely just increased the incentive to take the standard deduction for both federal
and state purposes.
100
COMPTROLLER OF MD., INCOME TAX SUMMARY REPORT: TAX YEAR 2017, at 3 (2018),
https://www.marylandtaxes.gov/reports/static-files/revenue/incometaxsummary/summary17.pdf
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substantially in 2018, Nebraska’s itemization rate would likely remain lower than
Maryland’s. In addition, the decline in Nebraska’s itemization rate would probably
be more precipitous than Maryland’s. These results are likely to be driven by factors
similar to those that caused the itemization rate disparity pre-TCJA including (a)
Maryland’s much lower state standard deduction, (b) Maryland’s higher total state
and local tax rate; (c) higher household income in Maryland and higher percentages
of Maryland taxpayers in the highest income categories (noting that high income
taxpayers typically itemize at higher rates than do lower income taxpayers),101 and
(d) higher average home prices and mortgage payments in Maryland 102 (which
would be expected to lead to higher home mortgage interest deductions and total
itemized deductions) in Maryland. Table 2 provides a comparison for some of these
numbers.
Table 2. Basic Tax & Income Data: Nebraska and Maryland
Nebraska103
2017
Standard
deduction (single)
Standard
deduction (MFJ)

2018

$6,350

$6,750

$12,700

$13,500

Maryland104
2017
Standard
Max of
deduction (single)
$2,000
Standard
Max of
deduction (MFJ)
$4,000

2018
Max of
$2,250
Max of
$4,500

[https://perma.cc/VEA4-KM3P]; Individual Income Tax Data by Size of AGI, Tax Year 2017 Table
B4, NEB. DEP’T OF REVENUE, https://revenue.nebraska.gov/research/statistics/nebraska-statisticsincome [https://perma.cc/ T39L-3F4A] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021); and author calculations.
101
See Table 2.
102
In 2018, the median home mortgage payment was $1,352 in Nebraska and $1,987 in
Maryland. Liz Knueven, The Average Monthly Mortgage Payment by State, City, and Year, BUS.
INSIDER (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/personal-finance/average-mortgagepayment# mortgage-payments-by-state [https://perma.cc/87U7-42SA] (using data from the Census
Bureau’s 2018 American Community Survey). Median home value, as of an article published in
early 2020, was $175,884 in Nebraska and $308,041 in Maryland. Marissa Perino & DominicMadori Davis, Here’s the Typical Home Price in Every State—and What You Can Actually Get for
That Money, BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 2020), https://www.businessinsider.com/average-home-prices-inevery-state-washington-dc-2019-6 [https://perma.cc/JR7T-L2VL] (using Zillow data). Hillary
Hoffower & Libertina Brandt, The Most Expensive and Affordable States to Buy a House, Ranked,
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/cost-to-buy-a-house-in-every-stateranked-2018-8 [https://perma.cc/RA7D-GGN6] (using Zillow data to report that the median listing
price was $215,000 in Nebraska and $329,989 in Maryland).
103
Chronology of Nebraska Tax Rates – 1993 to Present: Table 1, Income and Sales Tax,
NEB.
DEP’T
OF
REVENUE,
https://revenue.nebraska.gov/sites/revenue.nebraska.gov/files/doc/research/
chronology/4607table1.pdf [https://perma.cc/89CB-VJ4Z] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021) (listing income tax rate
data, income tax bracket data, and standard deduction amounts by year).
104
COMPTROLLER OF MD., MARYLAND: 2017 STATE & LOCAL TAX FORMS &
INSTRUCTIONS 12 (2018), https://www.marylandtaxes.gov/forms/17_forms/Resident_Booklet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ YT55-B92D] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021); COMPTROLLER OF MD., MARYLAND:
2018
STATE
&
LOCAL
TAX
FORMS
&
INSTRUCTIONS
12,
https://www.marylandtaxes.gov/forms/18_forms/ Resident_Booklet. pdf [https://perma.cc/ UK8ZJ3VB] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021).

26

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF TAX LAW

Top income tax
rate
Median
household
income106
% of taxpayers
with
AGI>$200K 107
% of taxpayers
with
AGI>$100K 108

6.84%

[Vol: 13:1

Top income tax
rate

8.95%
(including county level
tax)105

$60,847

$59,566

Median household
income

$82,747

$83,242

3.6%

4.0%

% of taxpayers
with AGI>$200K

6.6%

7.1%

16.7%

18.1%

% of taxpayers
with AGI>$100K

23.4%

24.5%

In addition, Nebraska’s and Maryland’s itemization uniformity
requirements are expected to impact not just state itemization rates, but also federal
itemization rates. This is because, where a state allows a taxpayer to itemize for
state purposes only if they also itemize for federal purposes, some taxpayers likely
conclude that the benefit of itemizing for state purposes (i.e., state income taxes
saved) exceeds the cost of itemizing for federal purposes (i.e., extra federal income
taxes paid). As a result, such a taxpayer should itemize for federal purposes so they
can itemize for state purposes. The number and percentage of such taxpayers would
be expected to increase after the TCJA in states like Nebraska and Maryland, where
the TCJA’s increase in the federal standard deduction was not accompanied by a
commensurate increase in the state’s standard deduction. 109 This is particularly
likely given the TCJA’s reduction in individual income tax rates, which means that
the value of federal deductions was smaller in 2018 than it was in 2017.

105

Maryland imposes state income tax at a top rate of 5.75%, and Maryland counties also
impose an additional county (or city) level tax on a taxpayer’s state taxable income. The Maryland
state tax authority collects this county-level income tax for the counties to assist local governments.
The additional county level income tax ranges from 2.25% to 3.2%, for a combined top rate of
between 8% and 8.95% of state/local income tax. Tax Rates Maryland Income Tax Rates and
Brackets, COMPTROLLER OF MD., https://www.marylandtaxes.gov/individual/income/tax-info/taxrates.php [https://perma.cc/G2KJ-TAAC] (last visited Oct. 8, 2021). Thanks to Neil Buchanan for
his insights about county-level income taxes in Maryland.
106
Gloria G. Guzman, American Community Survey Briefs: Household Income: 2018 at 3
(Sept. 2019), https://census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/publications/2019/acs/acsbr18-01.pdf
[https: //perma.cc/9RFU-7CJT] (report from the U.S. Census Bureau reporting data in 2018
inflation-adjusted dollars).
107
SOI Tax Stats – State Data FY 2017, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-statsstate-data-fy-2017 [https://perma.cc/9MJW-PKH6] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021), and author
calculations; SOI Tax Stats – State Data FY 2018, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-statsstate-data-fy-2018 [https://perma.cc/Y45R-QNXF] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021), and author
calculations.
108
Id.
109
In contrast, in a state like Maine, where the state standard deduction equals the federal
standard deduction, it is highly unlikely for any taxpayer to prefer to take the standard deduction for
federal purposes and itemized deductions for state purposes (absent material state disconformity).
Even if such a taxpayer existed, the difference between federal and state income tax rates is highly
likely to mean that taking the standard deduction (the preferred option for federal purposes)
minimizes net tax liability.
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b. Change in Itemization Behavior of Maryland and Nebraska
Taxpayers – Data & Modeling
Federal and state individual income tax filing data from 2017 and 2018
provide insight into how actual itemization behavior of Nebraska and Maryland
taxpayers changed after the TCJA. Again, the data reveal that the actual results
match the theoretical expectations.
Reducing Itemization Rates, In General
As illustrated in Figure 4, the federal and state itemization rates both for
Nebraska and Maryland taxpayers declined significantly between 2017 and
2018. 110 In each year, each state’s federal and state itemization rates are
approximately equal. Thus, in each state, the decline in federal itemization was
accompanied by an almost identical decline in state itemization.

% of Returns with Itemized Deductions

Figure 4. TCJA's Impact on U.S. Itemization Rates
and on Federal & State Itemization Rates
for NE and MD Taxpayers
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SOI Tax Stats – State Data FY 2017, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-statsstate-data-fy-2017 [https://perma.cc/9MJW-PKH6] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021); SOI Tax Stats –
State Data FY 2018, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-state-data-fy-2018
[https://perma.cc/ Y45R-QNXF] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021); COMPTROLLER OF MD., supra note
100, at 3; COMPTROLLER OF MD., INCOME TAX SUMMARY REPORT: TAX YEAR 2018, at 3 (2019),
https://www. marylandtaxes.gov/reports/static-files/revenue/incometaxsummary/summary18.pdf
[https://perma. cc/9HPV-26DA] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021); Individual Income Tax Data by Size
of AGI, Tax Years 2017 & 2018 Table B4, NEB. DEP’T OF REVENUE,
https://revenue.nebraska.gov/research/statistics/
nebraska-statistics-income
[https://perma.cc/T39L-3F4A] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021); and author calculations.
110
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Although itemization rates in both states declined, the extent of the declines
and the overall post-TCJA itemization rates varied by state. In Nebraska, the
itemization rate declined by just under 75%, and between 7% and 8% of taxpayers
continued to itemize after the TCJA. In contrast, in Maryland, the itemization rate
declined by just under 50%, and approximately 24% of taxpayers continued to
itemize after the TCJA.
The results in both Nebraska and Maryland were different than the
nationwide results. Federal itemization rates of Nebraskan taxpayers declined
slightly more than the nationwide decline (~63% decline), and post-TCJA
Nebraskans itemized somewhat less frequently than taxpayers nationwide. In
contrast, federal itemization rates of Maryland taxpayers declined less than the
nationwide decline, and post-TCJA Maryland taxpayers itemized more frequently
than taxpayers nationwide.
Causing Taxpayers to Itemize for Federal Purposes (Despite a
Larger Federal Standard Deduction)
The IRS declined to gather and provide the data needed to determine the
frequency with which taxpayers in states that require election uniformity opted to
itemize for federal purposes even though the federal standard deduction exceeded
their federal itemized deductions (i.e., paying extra federal taxes) to enable them to
itemize for state purposes (i.e., so they could save even more in state taxes).111
However, basic modeling, using information that is available, allows inferences to
be drawn about the existence of this effect.
Nebraska provides an example. In 2017, Nebraska’s standard deduction
matched the federal standard deduction, and it would be quite surprising if a
Nebraska taxpayer’s state itemized deductions exceeded their federal itemized
deductions. 112 So Nebraska taxpayers generally would not have benefited from
itemizing for state tax purposes while taking the standard deduction for federal
purposes. As a result, it is highly unlikely that any Nebraskan would have opted to
make a less favorable federal itemization choice in 2017 to enable them to make
their preferred state itemization choice.
However, more Nebraska taxpayers would have an economic incentive to
do so in 2018, after the TCJA. For example, consider a married couple filing jointly
in Nebraska with $100K AGI in 2018. If that couple had between ~$21.5K and
111

I asked the IRS Statistics of Income for data, parsed by state, of the number of taxpayers
who checked the box on line 30 of the 2017 Schedule A (indicating that a taxpayer chooses to take
federal itemized deductions even though the federal standard deduction is larger) and the number of
taxpayers who checked the box on line 18 of the 2018 Schedule A (same question, just with a
different line number). After an extensive back and forth, the IRS SOI explained that they do not
track this data as part of their regular statistical analyses, and they declined my request that they
perform a data run to pull this data for me. Email exchanges between E. Gross (among others) and
Heather M. Field (last email on Mar. 3, 2021) (on file with author).
112
Nebraska largely conforms to federal income tax laws applicable to individuals but does
not allow state or local taxes to be deducted for state purposes. Thus, a Nebraska taxpayer’s federal
itemized deductions would generally be larger than their state itemized deductions.
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$24K of itemized deductions for both state and federal purposes in 2018 and
holding everything else constant, 113 the couple likely would have been better off
itemizing for both federal and state tax purposes rather than taking the standard
deduction for both, even though the couple would be foregoing the benefit of the
higher federal standard deduction. 114 The analysis is similar with taxpayers of
different filing statuses and income levels, but the exact thresholds at which it
becomes economical to itemize vary. Thus, it is likely that some Nebraskans opted
for the less favorable federal itemization choice in 2018, which is more than the
number (basically zero) who likely did so in 2017.
The example of Maryland is similar, although slightly more complex. The
Maryland and federal standard deductions differed even in 2017. Thus, even preTCJA, some Maryland taxpayers likely would have opted to itemize and pay extra
in federal taxes so they could itemize for state purposes and save even more in state
taxes. However, the disparity between the Maryland and federal standard deduction
increased in 2018. That, together with the reduction in federal individual income
tax rates and the cap on the federal SALT deduction, means that it even more
Maryland taxpayers likely had a net economic incentive to opt for the less favorable
federal itemization choice in 2018 than in 2017.
Consider again the example of the married couple filing jointly (now in
Maryland) with $100K AGI. In 2017, they would likely have been better off
itemizing for both federal and state tax purposes than taking the standard deduction
for both (even though the couple would be foregoing the higher federal standard
deduction) if they had state and federal itemized deductions between approximately
$10.5K and $12.7K, holding everything else constant.115 The same couple in 2018
would likely have been better off itemizing for both (even though they would be
foregoing the larger federal standard deduction) if they had state and federal
itemized deductions between approximately $19K116 and $24K. In this example,

113
Author calculations using the formula in note 98 supra. Of course, everything else is
not constant. In particular, itemizing for state purposes increases the taxpayer’s SALT deduction for
federal purposes. This effect is ignored for ease in the basic numerical examples discussed.
However, taking the effect into account would either (a) push the taxpayer’s federal itemized
deductions above the federal standard deduction, meaning that the taxpayer would no longer have
conflicting itemization preferences; or (b) increase the cost of itemizing for federal purposes on the
margin, thereby slightly reducing the frequency with which the state-level benefit of itemizing
would exceed the federal-level cost of itemizing. Nevertheless, after the TCJA’s imposition of the
$10K cap on SALT deductions, any variation in the amount of state taxes would not have this effect
as long as the taxpayer’s total state taxes remained at least $10K.
114
Assume, for example, the couple had $23K of itemized deductions for both state and
federal purposes. By itemizing for state purposes rather than taking the standard deduction, the
taxpayer would save $649.80 (($23K-$13,500)*6.84%), but itemizing for federal purposes too
would only cost the taxpayer an extra $220 (($24K-$23K)*22%), meaning that the taxpayer reduces
their net tax liability by itemizing for both. There are, of course, other costs that could outweigh the
tax savings of itemizing, including additional tax preparation costs and the costs to the taxpayer of
compiling the information. However, both of those may already be sunk once the taxpayer gets to
the point of doing this analysis, in which case they should be ignored.
115
Author calculations using the formula in note 98 supra.
116
This number depends on the Maryland county in which the taxpayer lives. See supra
note 105 (explaining the imposition of county level income taxes in addition to the state income
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the range of itemized deductions in which taxpayers would benefit from making
the less favorable federal itemization deduction is more than twice as large in 2018
as in 2017. In addition, with the $10K cap on the SALT deduction for federal
purposes, it becomes more probable, in 2018, that a Maryland taxpayer’s state
itemized deductions and federal itemized deductions would be equal (or at least
close) in amount,117 which increases the chance that the taxpayer would have both
state and federal itemized deductions in the range where the benefit itemizing for
state tax purposes exceeds the cost of doing so for federal purposes. Nevertheless,
it is hard to know how the number of taxpayers with itemized deductions in this
larger range in 2018 compares to the number of taxpayers with itemized deductions
in the smaller range in 2017, at least without data that is unavailable. However, the
foregoing discussion suggests that it is likely that some Maryland taxpayers who
might have preferred to take the federal standard deduction in 2018 (if they could
make unconstrained choices) opted to itemize instead because of the value to them
of itemizing for state purposes.
Ultimately, basic modeling illustrates that it is reasonable to conclude that,
in some states that prohibit state itemization unless the taxpayer itemizes for federal
purposes, 118 more taxpayers whose federal standard deduction exceeded their
federal itemized deductions likely opted to itemize for federal purposes in 2018
than in 2017. Thus, although the TCJA’s itemization-related changes caused a large
reduction in federal itemization rates, that reduction was likely not as large as it
would have been had all states allowed independent itemization choices. Said
differently, absent the election uniformity requirement, Maryland’s federal and
state itemization rates, for example, would be expected to look more like
Oregon’s—more itemizers for state purposes and fewer itemizers for federal.
3. Key Takeaways from the Data
Federal itemization rates declined in all states after the enactment of the
TCJA, but a close look at the data reveals that the TCJA’s impact on itemization
tax). If the taxpayer is in a county with the maximum 3.2% tax rate, this number is closer to $18.8K.
If the taxpayer is in a county with the minimum 2.25% tax rate, this number is closer to $19.3K.
117
Pre-TCJA, there was always likely to be a disparity between a taxpayer’s SALT
deduction for federal and state purposes because the taxpayer generally could deduct Maryland state
income taxes for federal purpose but not for Maryland state income tax purposes. However, the
$10K cap on SALT increases the chances that the federal and state deductions are the same amount.
For example, if in 2018, a Maryland taxpayer has at least $10K in local property taxes, their SALT
deduction for federal purposes would be capped at $10K and their local tax deduction for state
purposes would also be $10K; the amount of their state income taxes would not change either.
Specifically, if only non-income taxes in Maryland are used as a deduction for federal purposes,
there are no Maryland or local income taxes used as a deduction for federal purposes that would
need to be added back to the itemized deductions allowed for Maryland purposes. See
COMPTROLLER OF MD., MARYLAND 2018 STATE & LOCAL TAX FORMS & INSTRUCTIONS 11 (2019),
https://www.maryland taxes.gov/forms/18_forms/Resident_Booklet.pdf [https://perma.cc/M92M2KYV].
118
This effect is quite unlikely to occur in states where the state standard deduction
matched the federal standard deduction because, as explained earlier, it would be rare for taxpayers
in these states to have conflicting itemization preferences at all.
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rates varied state-to-state depending on whether the state bound its taxpayers to
their federal itemization choices.
Within that core observation, there are several insights. First, in states that
allowed taxpayers to make independent itemization elections (e.g., Oregon), state
itemization rates may have remained quite high post-TCJA as they did in Oregon.
Thus, post-TCJA, many taxpayers in these states (including, for example, more than
22% of Oregon individual taxpayers) 119 continued to itemize for state purposes
despite switching to the standard deduction for federal purposes. Second, in states
(e.g., Nebraska or Maryland) that required election uniformity, the decline in state
itemization rates after the TCJA was almost identical to the decline in the federal
itemization rates for the state’s taxpayers. Third, even among states with the same
itemization uniformity rules and that largely conformed to the federal individual
income tax (again like Nebraska and Maryland), absolute itemization rates varied
significantly. Fourth, in states where standard deductions did not increase
commensurately with the increase to the federal standard deduction, more
taxpayers had conflicting itemization preferences post-TCJA (generally preferring
to itemize for state purposes but preferring the standard deduction for federal
purposes). Fifth, in states where standard deductions did not increase
commensurately with the increase to the federal standard deduction and that
required itemization election uniformity, more taxpayers in 2018 chose to take the
standard deduction for both federal and state purposes in 2018 even though their
state itemized deductions exceeded the state standard deduction. In these same
states, some other taxpayers, and likely more after the TCJA than before, did the
opposite—taking itemized deductions for both federal and state purposes even
though the federal standard deduction exceeded their federal itemized deductions.
III.
THE TCJA’S SIMPLIFYING EFFECT, CONSIDERING TAXPAYERS’
ITEMIZATION BEHAVIOR
The insights provided by the data demonstrate that it matters—to taxpayers,
to the IRS, and to state tax authorities—whether states bind taxpayers to the tax
elections they make for federal purposes. Yet little attention has been paid to the
simplicity and administrability implications of the interaction between state and
federal itemization elections. This is surprising because simplification was the
primary policy objective motivating the TCJA’s itemization-related changes.
However, the impact of states’ election uniformity rules on the degree of
simplification created by the TCJA may have been difficult to identify or appreciate
without a careful study of the federal and state individual income tax filing data
pre- and post-TCJA. Part II of this Article discussed the results of my study of that
data. In Part III, I use the insights from the data to analyze how states’ election
uniformity laws affected the simplification achieved by the TCJA’s itemizationrelated changes.

119

See supra Part II.B.1.b.
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A. For Taxpayers
Recall that the decline in itemization rates is only a relatively weak proxy
for the simplification experienced by taxpayers because, among other reasons,
taxpayers may continue with record-keeping, analysis, and related compliance
tasks even if they do not ultimately itemize. 120 With the federal itemization data
alone, however, it was difficult to estimate how frequently taxpayers who switched
from federal itemized deductions in 2017 to the federal standard deduction in 2018
continued to perform those tasks. 121 However, the addition of state-level
itemization data, as discussed in Part II allows for more insights into simplification
experienced by taxpayers as a result of the TCJA’s itemization-related changes, but
the insights differ depending on the state’s election uniformity rules.
1. Where Independent Itemization Elections Are Allowed
In Oregon, where taxpayers can make independent itemization elections,
~414,00 Oregon taxpayers switched to the standard deduction for federal purposes
after the TCJA, but ~404,000 of those taxpayers (i.e., >90%) continued to itemize
for state purposes. 122 These returns represent more than 22% of all annual
individual income tax returns filed in Oregon. 123 The taxpayers who filed these
returns clearly continued to keep records of the possible itemized deductions,
analyzed the allowability of itemized deductions, and took related compliance
tasks—even though they did not itemize for federal purposes. Thus, these data
establish the minimum number 124 of Oregon taxpayers for whom the purported
simplifying effect of the TCJA’s itemization-related changes was largely
eliminated.125 Because more than 90% of the Oregon taxpayers who switched to
the federal standard deduction post-TCJA continued to itemize for Oregon state
purposes, the simplification for taxpayers implied by the decline in federal
itemization rates for Oregon taxpayers was largely illusory. The analysis would be
similar for taxpayers in other states that, like Oregon, allow independent state

120

See supra Part I.D.1.
Id.
122
See supra Part II.B.1.b.
123
See supra note 94.
124
The actual number of taxpayers for whom the purported simplifying effect of the
TCJA’s itemization-related changes was largely eliminated may be higher if some taxpayers that
ultimately switched to the standard deduction for both federal and state purposes continued to keep
records and undertake analysis of possible itemized deductions to determine whether to itemize at
all.
125
Although federal income tax laws and state income tax laws are enacted by different
people at different times, individual taxpayers often encounter these laws together, as part of the
single overall undertaking of preparing their annual income tax returns. Thus, a taxpayer’s
experience of income tax return preparation includes all activities undertaken as part of filing federal
or state returns. Accordingly, this Article assesses simplification for taxpayers from the taxpayer’s
perspective, taking into account the totality of the taxpayer’s itemization experience—regardless of
whether it is undertaken as part of filing federal or state returns.
121
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itemization deductions,126 although the number and percentage of affected filers
likely varies by state.127
2. Where Itemization Election Uniformity Is Required
The insights are different for taxpayers in states like Maryland and
Nebraska, where election uniformity is required. These taxpayers cannot make
different state and federal itemization elections. Thus, while some Maryland and
Nebraska taxpayers who ultimately switched to the standard deduction post-TCJA
may have continued to keep records and analyze possible itemized deductions, the
data do not establish for certain that they did. This is unlike the example of Oregon,
where the data are clear that more than 90% of the taxpayers who switched to the
federal standard deduction continued to keep records of itemized deductions etc.
(so they could itemize for state purposes). As a result, the simplification
experienced by taxpayers in states like Maryland and Nebraska that require
itemization uniformity likely exceeded the simplification experienced by taxpayers
in states like Oregon that allow independent itemization deductions.
The analysis of the itemization data for Maryland and Nebraska taxpayers
provides additional insight into how simplification varied even among states that
require election uniformity. Specifically, the Maryland and Nebraska case studies
show that the lower the state’s standard deduction and the higher the state’s income
tax rates, the larger the incentive for taxpayers in these states to continue to keep
records and analyze itemized deductions because of the possibility of itemizing for
state tax purposes, and the less simplification these taxpayers experience. 128
***

126
This likely includes taxpayers in Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware,
Hawaii, Iowa, Kentucky, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New York, North Carolina, and
Wisconsin. See supra Figure 2; see infra Appendix A. This is less likely to occur in Idaho because,
although Idaho allows independent itemization choices, the Idaho state standard deduction matches
the federal standard deduction, meaning that it would be unusual for a taxpayer to itemize for state
purposes but not federal.
127
The number and percentage of filers affected in a state will depend, on state-specific
information (e.g., the size of the state’s itemized deduction and the state’s tax rates) that affects how
many taxpayers opt to switch to the federal standard deduction but continue to itemize for state
purposes. Also, recall that Oregon largely conforms to the federal income tax laws regarding
itemized deductions. The analysis is more complex in states where the income tax rules diverge
significantly from the federal income tax rules. In these states, it becomes difficult to isolate the
cause of the lack of simplification because the continued complexity experienced by taxpayers is
attributable, at least in part, to the differences between federal and state law—rather than being
primarily attributable to the state’s itemization election uniformity rule.
128
Taxpayers in a state like Maryland likely experienced less overall simplification than
taxpayers in a state like Nebraska that has a higher standard deduction than Maryland (but still lower
than the federal standard deduction). And taxpayers in Nebraska likely experienced less
simplification than taxpayers in a state like Missouri, where the state requires itemization election
uniformity but where the state standard deduction matched the high post-TCJA federal standard
deduction.
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In sum, the possibility of itemizing for state tax purposes reduces the
TCJA’s simplification effect, especially (but not exclusively) for taxpayers in states
that allow independent itemization decisions.
B. For the IRS
Recall that a decline in itemization rates is a reasonably good proxy for
simplification experienced by the IRS.129 Thus, with the dramatic decline in federal
itemization between 2017 and 2018, the TCJA’s itemization-related changes
simplified the IRS’s task of administering the federal income tax.
That simplifying effect for the IRS, however, was likely dampened, at least
slightly, by states that bound taxpayers to their federal itemization elections. To
illustrate, consider Maryland. Absent the state requirement for itemization election
uniformity, Maryland’s federal and state itemization rates would be expected to
look somewhat more like Oregon’s—more itemizers for state purposes and fewer
itemizers for federal purposes.130 That is, absent Maryland’s election uniformity
requirement, even more Maryland taxpayers would have switched to the federal
standard deduction than actually did. And this would have simplified the IRS’s
enforcement task even more than the TCJA’s itemization-related changes actually
did. However, because Maryland requires itemization election uniformity, the
simplification benefit experienced by the IRS as a result of the TCJA’s itemizationrelated changes was not quite as large as it could have been had taxpayers not been
required to make uniform elections. The magnitude of this effect may be small
given the infrequency with which the value of itemizing for state purposes will
exceed the cost of itemizing (rather than taking the standard deduction) for federal
purposes. However, there is likely to be at least some dampening of the IRS’s
simplification benefit with respect to taxpayers in states that require itemization
election uniformity.
That dampening effect for the IRS, however, generally should not arise
where states allow independent itemization choices. In these states, taxpayers’ state
itemization choices are not affected by their federal itemization choices, so
taxpayers are free to opt for the federal standard deduction if that best reduces their
federal income tax. Thus, the federal itemization rate in these states will likely
decline as much as possible, likely yielding as much simplification for the IRS as
possible, without a dampening effect.
C. For State Tax Authorities
The TCJA’s itemization-related changes also affect state tax administration,
and the impact on state tax authorities, once again, depends largely on the states’
itemization uniformity rules and the taxpayers’ itemization choices.
In states that require election uniformity, the TCJA’s itemization-related
changes likely simplified the administration of the state tax regimes in a manner
very similar to the way they simplified the administration of the federal income tax
129
130

See supra Part I.D.2.
See supra Part II.B.2.
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regime.131 In these states (e.g., Nebraska and Maryland), the dramatic decline in
federal itemization rates was accompanied by an almost identical decline in state
itemization rates. 132 As a result, state tax authorities processed fewer forms
reporting itemized deductions post-TCJA. And where fewer state taxpayers
itemized deductions, there were fewer taxpayers whose itemized deductions might
be audited by state tax authorities. These changes likely made enforcement easier
and less costly for state tax authorities.
The TCJA’s itemization-related changes had a very different impact on state
tax authorities in states that allowed taxpayers to make independent itemization
choices. The decline in federal itemization rates for taxpayers in these states was
not necessarily accompanied by a similar decline in state itemization. Indeed, state
itemization rates may not have declined much at all, even if federal itemization
rates for the state’s taxpayers declined significantly. Where federal itemization rates
declined significantly more than state itemization rates, state tax administration
became more complex, rather than simpler, post-TCJA.
The example of Oregon helps to illustrate. Recall that more than 90% of
Oregon taxpayers who switched to the standard deduction for federal purposes
continued to itemize for state purposes. 133 This complicated Oregon state tax
administration for multiple reasons. Post-TCJA, state tax authorities could no
longer benefit from data-sharing with the IRS about itemized deductions reported
on these returns. The returns did not itemize for federal purposes, so there were no
longer federal data about itemized deductions to share. 134 In addition, state tax
authorities could no longer piggyback on federal audits of the itemized deductions
on these returns. The returns did not itemize for federal purposes, meaning there
were no itemized deductions on these returns for the IRS to audit, and thus no
federal audits of the returns’ itemized deductions on which to piggyback. 135
Further, where taxpayers itemized deductions for state but not federal purposes,
state tax authorities were less able to rely on the deterrent effect of the threat of
federal audits relating to the itemized deductions. This could have increased statelevel noncompliance. 136 Thus, the TCJA’s itemization-related changes made it
131

See supra Parts I.D.2, III.B.
See supra Part II.B.2.
133
See supra Part II.B.1.b.
134
See Scharff, supra note 11, at 714-15 (discussing federal to state data sharing).
135
See Luna & Watts, supra note 7, at 260 (discussing the states’ ability to “piggyback on
federal tax audits and professional education programs, participate in data exchange programs, and
cooperate in compliance initiative”). But see James Alm, Brian Erard & Jonathan S. Feinstein, The
Relationship Between State and Federal Tax Audits, EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF HOUSEHOLD
TAXATION 236 (Martin Feldstein & James M. Poterba eds., 1996) (suggesting that state piggyback
audits were relatively rare). Even if states do not commonly initiate audits piggybacking on federal
audits, many states require that taxpayers report to the state tax authority any change in tax liability
paid to the IRS as a result of an audit, filing of an amended return, etc. See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. §
314.380 (2019). This enables easy conforming action by the state, as appropriate, even without an
independent state audit.
136
See Scharff, supra note 11, at 735-37; Liucija Birskyte, Effects of Tax Auditing: Does
the Deterrent Deter?, RESEARCH J. ECON., BUS. & ICT, Nov. 30, 2013 (concluding that deterrent
effects of federal audits spill over to positively impact state tax compliance). The deterrent effect of
the possibility of federal audits is particularly important if a state generally does not do many
piggyback audits. See supra note 135.
132
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harder for state tax authorities to enforce state income tax laws in states like Oregon
that allowed taxpayers to make independent itemization choices.137
D. Key Takeaways about Simplification
In sum, states’ itemization election uniformity rules affected the extent to
which the TCJA’s itemization-related changes led to simplification for taxpayers,
the IRS, and state tax authorities.
Where states obligated taxpayers to take the standard deduction for state
purposes if they took the standard deduction for federal purposes, the TCJA’s
itemization-related changes generally simplified across the board. Taxpayers likely
experienced at least some simplification. For the IRS and state tax authorities, tax
administration became materially easier post-TCJA because of the decline in the
number of itemizers for federal and state income tax purposes respectively. This
simplification benefit for the IRS, however, was dampened to the extent that
taxpayers opted to itemize for federal purpose (even though their standard
deduction was larger) so they could itemize for state purposes.
Where states allowed taxpayers to itemize for state purposes regardless of
whether they itemized for federal purposes, the TCJA’s itemization-related changes
had a very different effect on simplification. The IRS experienced more
simplification because there was no dampening effect (i.e., taxpayers would not
itemize for federal purposes if the federal standard deduction was larger).
Taxpayers in these states, however, likely experienced less simplification. Many
continued to itemize post-TCJA (albeit for state, rather than federal, purposes),
which made the TCJA’s simplification benefit for taxpayers largely illusory in
some cases.
In addition, state tax administration in states that allowed independent
itemization elections became materially more complex post-TCJA because many
taxpayers continued to itemize for state purposes even though they switched to the
standard deduction for federal purposes. That increase in complexity for state tax
authorities reflected, at least in part, a reallocation of enforcement burden—from
the IRS which, post-TCJA, no longer needed to worry about enforcement with
respect to some taxpayers’ itemized deductions (because those taxpayers no longer
itemized for federal purposes) to the state tax authorities who needed to continue to
enforce the laws about taxpayers’ itemized deductions without help from the IRS.
Thus, in states that allowed independent itemization elections, the TCJA’s
itemization-related changes likely resulted in a net shift of some enforcement

137

In addition, tax authorities in states that allow independent itemization decisions may
have incurred slightly increased administration costs if they state-specific forms and guidance. See,
e.g., OR. DEP’T OF REVENUE, 2018 SCHEDULE OR-A (2018). However, where a state, like Oregon,
largely conformed to the federal itemized deductions, the costs of creating the new form may have
been relatively low. Thus, in states that allow independent itemization choices, the increase in
enforcement complexity, discussed in the text, is likely to be the most significant source of
additional state tax administrative complexity that arose after the TCJA’s itemization-related
changes.
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responsibilities from the IRS to state tax authorities.138 This shift likely reduced
efficiency of tax administration too because it is generally more costly (in relation
to revenue collected) to administer the same law at the state level than at the federal
level.139
The foregoing discussion assumes that states largely conform to federal
income tax laws, including the changes made by the TCJA. 140 But many states do
not conform, which often exacerbates the complexity faced both by individual
taxpayers and by the states. 141 However, as this Article illustrates, it is critical to
consider state election uniformity laws because, even where state tax laws largely
conform to federal tax laws, states’ election uniformity rules can thwart the
achievement of federal tax policy goals.
IV.
TAX ELECTIONS & THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE FEDERAL AND STATE
INCOME TAX REGIMES
A. Broader Lessons from the Itemization Election Example
This Article’s analysis of how states’ election uniformity rules affected the
simplification achieved by the TCJA’s itemization-related changes to federal tax
laws illustrates a broader point. Specifically, states’ tax election uniformity rules
are critical to understanding the relationship between the federal and state tax
regimes, and these rules should be considered in any policy analysis of a tax change
that relates to a tax election. There are hundreds of tax elections, 142 and the
itemization election, discussed here, is merely one example of where the policy
implications of a federal tax law change cannot be fully understood without
understanding states’ tax election uniformity rules.
This is true for many other tax elections, including for example a married
couple’s election whether to file jointly or separately,143 an eligible corporation’s
election to be taxed as an “S corporation” rather than as a “C corporation,” 144 and
the election to have certain corporate acquisitions taxed as asset purchases rather

138

The magnitude of that shift would vary by state depending on what percentage of state
taxpayers switched to the standard deduction for federal purposes but continued to itemize for state
purposes. A higher percentage results in a larger shift of enforcement costs from the IRS to the state
tax authority.
139
See Scharff, supra note 11, at 708.
140
This discussion also assumes states are clear about their choices to conform (or not) and
to bind taxpayers to their federal elections (or not). This is not always the case. For example, some
states took a while to decide how to proceed on these issues after the TCJA, which created confusion,
thereby further exacerbating the complexity faced by taxpayers and state tax authorities. See, e.g.,
Jared Walczak, Arizona Delivers Rate Cuts and Tax Conformity, TAX FOUND. (June 6, 2019),
https://taxfoundation.org/arizona-income-tax-cuts-tax-conformity/ [https://perma.cc/X3SJ-P72Z]
(explaining that Arizona’s tax forms for 2018 assumed Arizona’s income tax would conform to the
TCJA, but Arizona did not actually conform until the end of May 2019).
141
See supra note 11.
142
DECHELLIS & HORNE, supra note 14 (discussing over 300 tax elections).
143
I.R.C. § 6031.
144
I.R.C. § 1362.
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than stock purchases.145 These federal tax elections and others are also available at
the state level in many states, and as with the itemization election, states take
different approaches to election uniformity requirements. 146 Thus, states’ tax
election uniformity rules for each of these elections are likely to affect the policy
consequences of changing these elections or changing laws that would affect
taxpayers’ election decisions.
The married filing status election provides an example of how this Article’s
insights apply. Married taxpayers in Minnesota must use the same filing status for
state income tax purposes as they use for federal purposes.147 In contrast, Iowa
allows married taxpayers to make a fully independent filing status elections for state
purposes regardless of their federal filing status election. 148 Michigan’s approach
falls in between: married taxpayers who file jointly for federal purposes must also
file jointly for Michigan purposes, but married taxpayers who file separately for
federal purposes may make an independent filing status election for Michigan
purposes.149
A change to federal tax law that affects a married couple’s choice about
their federal filing status likely has different consequences for couples in these
different states. Consider, for example, two federal tax provisions enacted recently
to help taxpayers weather the economic distress created by the pandemic: the
recovery rebate credit enacted by the CARES Act in March 2020, 150 and the
exclusion for unemployment benefits enacted by the American Rescue Plan Act
enacted in March 2021. 151 Both provisions increased the incentive for some married
couples to file separately rather than jointly for 2020. 152 If, because of these
145

I.R.C. § 338(h)(10).
With section 338(h)(10) elections, many states bind taxpayers to their federal choice,
but several states do not provide guidance about whether independent state-level section 338(h)(10)
elections are allowed or required. See Corporate Income Tax 10.5.3, Bloomberg Tax,
https://www.bloomberglaw.com/product/tax/view_menu/corporate_income_tax
[https://perma.cc/TWX2-EZ4D] (last visited Nov. 21, 2021) (identifying, for each state, whether
separate state election can be made for purposes of section 338(h)(10)). With S corporation
elections, states also take a variety of approaches, including providing that a corporation’s federal S
corporation election applies for state purposes too, providing that a federal S corporation must file
an additional state S corporation election (otherwise, the corporation will not be treated as an S
corporation for state purposes), and providing that a corporation’s federal S corporation election
generally applies for state purposes too but that a corporation can opt out of state S corporation
treatment. A Comprehensive Guide to State S Election Requirements, EMINUTES (Dec. 6, 2017),
https://eminutes.com/a-comprehensive-guide-to-state-s-election-requirements
[https://perma.cc/H6S3-ZQWR].
147
MINN. STAT. § 289A.08, Subdiv. 6 (2020).
148
IOWA DEP’T OF REVENUE, IA 1040 INCOME TAX RETURN 2020 (2021).
149
MICH. DEP’T OF TREASURY, MICHIGAN 2020 MI-1040 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX FORMS
AND INSTRUCTIONS (2021).
150
Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security Act, Pub. L. No. 116-136, § 6428
(2020).
151
American Rescue Plan Act of 2021, Pub. L. No. 117-2, § 9042 (2021).
152
See Andrew Gross et al., Recovery rebates: Tax planning pitfalls and opportunities,
THE TAX ADVISER, July 1, 2020; Amber Gray-Fenner, What You Need to Know Now About NonTaxable Unemployment, FORBES (Mar. 14, 2021), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ambergrayfenner/2021/03/
14/what-you-need-to-know-now-about-non-taxable-unemployment
[https://perma.cc/M2TZ-7NTK].
146
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changes, a couple opted to file separately for federal purposes for 2020, the couple
also had to file separately for Minnesota purposes in 2020 but could still file jointly
for Iowa and Michigan purposes. Thus, Minnesota couples with conflicting filing
status preferences for federal and state purposes (e.g., wanting to file separately for
federal purposes but jointly for state purposes) had to choose one filing status to
use for both purposes. If a Minnesota couple with conflicting filing status
preferences filed separately for federal purposes to benefit from the recovery rebate
and unemployment benefits exclusion, the couple accepted less preferred state tax
treatment. If a Minnesota couple filed jointly to minimize state income tax, the
couple sacrificed some or all of the benefits of these recently enacted federal tax
provisions. In contrast, married couples in Michigan or Iowa did not need to make
this choice; regardless of how they preferred to file for state purposes, such couples
could opt to file separately for federal purposes to benefit from the recovery rebate
and unemployment benefits exclusion.
This is a brief example, but it illustrates that these two recent federal tax law
changes that were enacted to help taxpayers through the pandemic likely have
different tax consequences for taxpayers depending on their state’s election
uniformity rule regarding the married filing status election. A more comprehensive
analysis, along the lines of this Article’s analysis of the impact of states’ itemization
election uniformity rules, could identify the policy implications of those
differences, including determining the specific situations in which the federal
policy goal motivating these changes is most likely to be thwarted. Even without
deeper analysis, however, this filing status example shows that this Article’s
insights about the impact of states’ election uniformity rules are generalizable to
other contexts.
Ultimately, this Article’s analysis of the itemization election reveals that
states’ tax election uniformity rules create previously underappreciated interactions
between the federal and state tax systems. These state-level rules can undermine
the achievement of federal policy goals, and differences among these state-level
rules can cause federal tax changes to apply differently to taxpayers in different
states. Thus, tax election uniformity rules are an important part of analyzing the
policy implications of a change to any of the hundreds of federal tax elections or a
change that alters taxpayers’ choices pursuant to any tax election (as the TCJA’s
itemization-related changes did). And when understanding the relationship between
the federal and state tax regimes more broadly, scholars and policymakers should
consider states’ tax election uniformity rules in addition to the more commonly
discussed issues of conformity, federal tax benefits for states, and cooperative tax
administration.153
B. Using These Lessons When Making Tax Policy Decisions
This Article’s insights into the cross-jurisdictional impact of states’ tax
election uniformity rules might encourage action. Perhaps a greater appreciation of
how each regime’s laws affect the administrability of the other’s reinforces the
existing scholarship encouraging federal and state legislators and administrators to
153

See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
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collaborate on enforcement initiatives and on tax law changes that advance shared
policy objectives.154
In particular, federal policymakers should consider how states’ tax election
uniformity rules might advance or hinder the federal policy objective (such as
simplification) motivating any federal tax law change. To the extent that states’
election uniformity laws are likely to undermine the achievement of federal policy
objectives, federal legislators could also work with state legislators to try to mitigate
that effect. Alternatively, proponents of the federal law change could be more
circumspect about their rhetoric when touting the policy benefits of a change, as
compared to how TCJA proponents touted the simplifying effect of the itemizationrelated changes. Adjustments to the rhetoric could increase the chances that the
taxpayers’ experiences match the promises. Further, to assist federal policymakers
in better understanding the compliance burden associated with the interaction
between federal and state tax laws, the IRS might consider adding questions to the
Individual Taxpayer Burden survey to enable them to make better predictions about
the compliance burdens created by the interactions between federal and state tax
laws. 155 More data about the taxpayer burdens created by the such interactions
could inform future decision-making, both by federal policymakers and state
policymakers.
In addition, when state policymakers examine any of their election
uniformity rules and evaluate possible changes, they should carefully consider the
policy tradeoffs that their choice of uniformity rule makes. 156 For example, a state
that prioritizes administrability in the context of a particular election might lean
toward requiring election uniformity, but a state that prioritizes state fiscal
sovereignty in that context might lean toward allowing independent elections. 157
Further, state policymakers could pay more attention to proposed federal tax
changes (particularly those touted as simplifying) that, when coupled with the
state’s election uniformity rules, are likely to materially increase state-level
administration costs. This could lead state policymakers to become more vocal
about sharing any concerns regarding those proposed changes with federal
legislators.158 State legislators could also try to measure the complexity that arises
154

See Duncan & Luna, note 11, at 663; Gravelle & Gravelle, supra note 7, at 643
(discussing a collaborative proposal intended to achieve “substantial savings in tax administration
as well as compliance by taxpayers and resolution of issues in the courts”); Scharff, supra note 11,
at (advocating for more fed/state tax cooperativity in general, not just in the context of federal
changes).
155
See supra notes 58-62 and accompanying text (discussing the IRS’s income taxpayer
burden model and the survey on which it relies). The ITB survey currently asks for record-keeping
burden and out-of-pocket-cost information explicitly excluding any such burdens arising from state
and local taxes. The survey could be modified, for example, to ask about those separately or to ask
for taxpayer estimates about burdens and costs both with and without the state/local considerations.
156
Some states already do this to some extent. See, e.g., AUXIER & RUEBEN, supra note 12
(Kansas considering administrability issues).
157
See Mason, supra note 7 (discussing different policy considerations that motivate statelevel choices).
158
See Gravelle & Gravelle, supra note 7, at 646 (encouraging states to pursue “greater
vigilance regarding issues under discussion at the federal level that do not appear to have a direct
impact”—more revenue focused, but equally applicable for simplicity concerns).
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for taxpayers and administrators from their existing election uniformity laws to give
them more information about these state-level rules.
CONCLUSION
States’ tax election uniformity rules should be considered in the policy
analysis of any federal or state tax law change that relates to a tax election.
Otherwise, the implications of that change cannot be fully understood. However,
exactly what that consideration should entail, how much weight those
considerations should be given, and what additional actions federal and state
policymakers should take in light of those considerations are all normative
questions that merit a separate article. Some possible ideas are mentioned above,
but recommendations might be contentious.
Federal policymakers might argue, for example, that the additional
complexity taxpayers and state tax authorities experience because of a state’s
itemization uniformity laws is the fault of state policymakers and should be
addressed by them. On the other hand, state policymakers might argue that the
additional complexity for taxpayers and state tax authorities is caused by, and
should be addressed by, federal policymakers who know that state tax laws are
generally based on federal tax laws and who nevertheless repeatedly change federal
tax laws with little regard for the complexity that ripples through the state tax
system. Yet, taxpayers might struggle to disaggregate which complexities are
attributable to the federal income tax regime and which are attributable to the state
income tax regime. And if taxpayers are promised a particular policy result (such
as simplification) but do not experience it, that may harm tax morale and may
undermine their faith in the tax system(s) or in political leaders more generally159—
regardless of whether federal or state policymakers are responsible for the result.
This Article, however, does not seek to determine whether federal or state
policymakers bear more blame for the gap between the simplification promised by
the proponents of the TCJA’s itemization-related changes and the more limited
simplification experienced by many taxpayers. Nor is this Article concerned about
which set of lawmakers is more at fault for increases in administrative complexity
for the other set of tax administrators. And the goal of this Article is not to push for
specific changes with respect to itemized deductions, election uniformity rules, or
otherwise. Rather, this Article’s objective is to use data regarding the itemization
election as an example to illuminate the underappreciated interactions between
federal and state income tax laws that arise because of whether states obligate
taxpayers to make the same choices for state tax purposes as they do for federal.
This gives federal and state policymakers more visibility into ways in which their
federal and state tax policy decisions are intertwined, thereby enabling
policymakers to consider these interactions when making future tax policy choices.

159

The magnitude of this impact, however, is unclear when trust in government officials is
already quite low.
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APPENDIX A. CHANGES IN FEDERAL ITEMIZATION RATES BY STATE160
2017 TY
Federal
Itemization
Rate

2018 TY
Federal
Itemization
Rate

Jurisdiction
Alabama
Alaska
Arizona
Arkansas
California

26.7%
23.0%
29.8%
22.8%
35.7%

8.5%
7.7%
10.9%
6.9%
17.7%

% Decline
in Federal
Itemization
Rate
(as a % of
2017 rate)
68.0%
66.7%
63.2%
69.6%
50.5%

Colorado

33.6%

13.5%

59.8%

Connecticut
Delaware
D.C.
Florida
Georgia
Hawaii
Idaho
Illinois
Indiana
Iowa
Kansas
Kentucky

41.8%
32.9%
40.9%
26.2%
33.9%
30.6%
29.4%
32.5%
23.1%
30.8%
26.2%
26.7%

15.1%
11.7%
22.3%
9.0%
13.8%
13.9%
8.9%
11.3%
6.1%
7.5%
8.1%
6.6%

63.7%
64.4%
45.5%
65.5%
59.2%
54.4%
69.5%
65.4%
73.6%
75.6%
69.1%
75.3%

Louisiana

24.4%

7.8%

68.2%

Maine
Maryland
Massachusetts
Michigan

27.4%
46.7%
37.8%
27.4%

7.4%
24.0%
14.7%
7.6%

73.1%
48.5%
61.1%
72.1%

Minnesota

35.5%

11.3%

68.3%

Mississippi
Missouri
Montana
Nebraska
Nevada
N.H

24.4%
26.7%
29.7%
28.2%
26.6%
31.8%

7.7%
7.7%
8.9%
7.6%
9.9%
9.9%

68.6%
71.0%
70.0%
72.9%
62.8%
68.9%

State's Itemization Election
Uniformity Law 2017, 2018

Independent choice allowed
No state PIT
Independent choice allowed
Independent choice allowed
Independent choice allowed
Conformity starting point is FTI (so
federal itemization choice is built in
for state purposes)
No state itemized deductions
Independent choice allowed
Fully bound to federal choice
No state PIT
Fully bound to federal choice
Independent choice allowed
Independent choice allowed
No state itemized deductions
No state itemized deductions
Independent choice allowed
Bound to federal standard deduction
Independent choice allowed
Deduction allowed for federal
itemized deductions in excess of
federal standard deduction
Bound to federal standard deduction
Bound to federal standard deduction
No state itemized deductions
No state itemized deductions
2018 and beyond: independent
choice allowed
2017 and prior: conformity starting
point was FTI, so federal
itemization choice was built in for
state purposes
Independent choice allowed
Bound to federal standard deduction
Independent choice allowed
Bound to federal standard deduction
No state PIT
No state broad-based PIT

SOI Tax Stats – Historic Table, Individual Income and Tax Data, by State and Size of
Adjusted Gross Income, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-historic-table-2
[https://perma.cc/ YPZ4-NGJU] (last visited Nov. 22, 2021), and author calculations.
160
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2017 TY
Federal
Itemization
Rate

2018 TY
Federal
Itemization
Rate

Jurisdiction

% Decline
in Federal
Itemization
Rate
(as a % of
2017 rate)

New Jersey

42.2%

17.0%

59.8%

New Mexico

22.8%

7.3%

68.0%

New York

35.4%

12.4%

64.8%

N.C.

29.2%

10.3%

64.8%

North Dakota

19.8%

5.6%

72.0%

Ohio
Oklahoma
Oregon
Pennsylvania
Rhode Island

26.3%
23.8%
37.5%
29.2%
33.3%

6.7%
8.1%
14.6%
8.9%
10.6%

74.6%
65.8%
61.2%
69.6%
68.2%

South Carolina

28.1%

9.5%

66.2%

South Dakota
Tennessee
Texas

18.2%
20.3%
26.1%

5.3%
6.7%
9.2%

71.1%
67.0%
64.8%

Utah

36.3%

14.8%

59.2%

Vermont

27.8%

7.1%

74.3%

Virginia
Washington
West Virginia

38.1%
31.4%
17.4%

17.7%
13.4%
4.3%

53.5%
57.3%
75.2%

Wisconsin

31.8%

7.8%

75.6%

Wyoming

22.2%

6.5%

70.9%

Minimum
Maximum
Median

17.4%
46.7%
29.2%

4.3%
24.0%
8.9%

45.5%
75.6%
68.0%

43

State’s Itemization Election
Uniformity Law 2017, 2018

No state itemized deductions
(except property taxes and medical
expenses—not tied to federal
itemization)
Fully bound to federal choice
Bound to federal standard deduction
in 2017; independent choice
allowed in 2018
Independent choice allowed
Conformity starting point is FTI (so
federal itemization choice is built in
for state purposes)
No state itemized deductions
Fully bound to federal choice
Independent choice allowed
No state itemized deductions
No state itemized deductions
Conformity starting point is FTI (so
federal itemization choice is built in
for state purposes)
No state PIT
No state broad-based PIT
No state PIT
State credit determined with
reference to federal itemized
deduction or standard deduction
(fully bound)
No state itemized deductions
(conformity starting point FTI 2017
and prior; FAGI for 2018 and after)
Fully bound to federal choice
No state PIT
No state itemized deductions
State credit for certain federal
itemized deductions exceed the state
standard deduction (but a taxpayer
can claim credit even if they do not
itemize on federal return—so
independent choice).
No state PIT
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APPENDIX B. CHANGES IN FEDERAL & STATE ITEMIZATION (TY2017 TO TY2018) FOR OREGON, NEBRASKA, & MARYLAND – DETAILS
TY2017

TY2018

# of
Returns
with
Itemized
Deductions

% of
Returns
with
Itemized
Deductions

# of
Returns
with
Itemized
Deductions

% of
Returns
with
Itemized
Deductions

Decline (from
2017 to 2018) in #
of Taxpayers Who
Itemize

% Decline
(2017 to 2018) in
Itemization Rate
(as a % of the 2017
rate)

1,938,620
1,785,350

727,520
824,001

37.5%
46.2%

1,965,610
1,819,167

286,450
787,032

14.6%
43.3%

441,070
36,969

61.2%
6.3%

Federal Returns

905,980

255,410

164

28.2%

909,600

69,390

7.6%

186,020

72.9%

866,360

243,000

28.0%

867,910

62,570

7.2%

180,430

74.3%

MD

Federal Returns
State Returns165

2,986,140
3,107,116

1,393,890
1,412,104

46.7%
45.4%

3,004,390
3,123,790

722,050
741,204

24.0%
23.7%

671,840
670,900

48.5%
47.8%

US

Federal Returns

152,903,232

46,852,677

30.6%

153,774,296

17,532,594

11.4%

29,320,083

62.8%

Total # of
Returns

OR

NE

Federal Returns162
State Returns163

State Returns

Change

Total # of
Returns

SOI Tax Stats – Historic Table, Individual Income and Tax Data, by State and Size of Adjusted Gross Income, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soitax-stats-historic-table-2 [https://perma.cc/YPZ4-NGJU] (last visited Nov. 22, 2021); and author calculations. Same source for Oregon federal returns, Nebraska
federal returns, and Maryland federal returns.
163
See supra note 90.
164
See NEB. DEP’T OF REVENUE, supra note 100.
165
COMPTROLLER OF MD., INCOME TAX SUMMARY REPORT: TAX YEAR 2017, at 3 (2018); COMPTROLLER OF MD., INCOME TAX SUMMARY REPORT: TAX
YEAR 2018, at 3 (2019).
162

